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ABSTRACT
The State of Man-in-the-Middle TLS Proxies:
Prevalence and User Attitudes
Mark Thomas O’Neill
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Master of Science
We measure the prevalence and uses of Man-in-the-Middle TLS proxies using a Flash
tool deployed with a Google AdWords campaign. We generate 15.2 million certificate tests
across two large-scale measurement studies and find that 1 in 250 TLS connections are
intercepted by proxies. The majority of these proxies appear to be benevolent, however we
identify over 3,600 cases where eight malware products are using this technology nefariously.
We also find thousands of instances of negligent, duplicitous, and suspicious behavior, some
of which degrade security for users without their knowledge. Distinguishing these types of
practices is challenging in practice, indicating a need for transparency and user awareness.
We also report the results of a survey of 1,976 individuals regarding their opinions of
TLS proxies. Responses indicate that participants hold nuanced opinions on security and
privacy trade-offs, with most recognizing legitimate uses for the practice, but also concerned
about threats from hackers or government surveillance. There is strong support for notification
and consent when a system is intercepting their encrypted traffic, although this support varies
depending on the situation. A significant concern about malicious uses of TLS inspection is
identity theft, and many would react negatively and some would change their behavior if
they discovered inspection occurring without their knowledge. We also find that a small but
significant number of participants are jaded by the current state of affairs and have lost any
expectation of privacy.

Keywords: SSL, TLS, Proxy, MITM, man in the middle, measurement, survey, AdWords,
security, malware, firewall, censorship
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Introduction
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Chapter 1
Introduction

Transport Layer Security (TLS) [60], is the most popular security protocol used
on the Internet today.1 Many network applications leverage TLS, including email clients,
VPN clients, instant messaging services, and all web browsers. TLS, when used correctly,
provides a variety of security guarantees to a connection between a client and server, including
confidentiality, integrity, and authentication. Throughout the last decade, these pieces have
proven to be relatively resilient, requiring only minor patches to address weaknesses. However,
the authentication portion of TLS has serious flaws that subject the whole protocol to one of
the very attacks it was meant to prevent: Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks.

1.1

Background

Normally TLS authentication is performed by only one of the parties in the communication,
although mutual authentication is supported by the protocol. A typical scenario is shown
1

Prior versions of TLS were known as Secure Socket Layer (SSL). Unless otherwise specified, TLS will be
used in this thesis to mean both TLS and SSL.

Client

TLS Connect
Certificate Chain
certificate validation

Key Exchange
Encrypted Traffic

Figure 1.1: High-level example of server authentication under TLS
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Server

Certificate Validation
Comodo

Verisign

TurkTrust

Server Chain

Root Store

GeoTrust

www.google.com

Google Internet
Authority G2
valid
signature

leaf certificate

...
valid
signature

intermediate certificate

Figure 1.2: Example of signature chain validation for TLS authentication
in Figure 1.1. First, a client (e.g., browser) connects to an intended remote host (e.g.,
www.google.com). Before any data is sent from the server it will send a chain of digital
certificates to the client, which vouches for the authenticity of the server. After validation
and acceptance of the certificate chain, the client is assured that the host public key found
within the certificate chain, is in fact the proper public key for intended host. The client then
encrypts some preliminary data used to bootstrap the encryption tunnel using that public key.
The server proves that it owns the corresponding private key by successful decryption of that
data, and subsequent response. All data sent between the two endpoints is then encrypted.
To validate a received certificate, the client must perform a series of checks. Among
these is ensuring that the certificate has a valid status (e.g., is not expired, is not revoked,
3

etc.), ensuring the certificate is issued to the hostname to which the client expected to
connect (e.g., making sure the certificate bears the name amazon.com), and validating that
the certificate has a proper signature from a Certificate Authority (CA).
This last step—validating the signature in the certificate—is shown in Figure 1.2.
Each certificate in the chain must be digitally signed by the succeeding certificate in the
chain, and it is up to the client to validate these signatures. Often, intermediate certificates
are presented by the server in addition to the one it had issued to it from a signing authority.
The client ensures that each certificate in the chain is properly signed by private key of the
next certificate in the chain, and, finally, that the last certificate in the chain is signed by the
private key of a root CA. For this last signature check, the client utilizes a locally-installed
root store of trusted CAs. In this example, the leaf certificate for www.google.com is properly
signed by the intermediate certificate owned by Google Internet Authority G2, which is in
turn signed by the GeoTrust CA certificate, which resides in the root store of the browser.
The root store is usually shipped with a browser or operating system. If the leaf certificate
is to be trusted, its chain of signatures must link back to a CA from the root store. This
constitutes the trust that the server is the website it claims to be. If this validation fails, the
connection is aborted, as the absence of a valid chain indicates the possible presence of a
MITM attacker. We call this authentication scheme the CA system.
Though the CA system may seem sufficient, in use it exhibits three alarming traits:
1. Clients trust too many (untrustworthy) CAs: A recent study found 1,832 browsertrusted signing certificates in use on a single day, controlled by 683 organizations[20].
Each of these CAs must follow best practices and be worthy of the implicit trust given
to them. However, the greatness of their numbers make it prohibitive for concerned
citizens to audit their behavior and many CAs have been compromised by hackers or
found accidentally providing their private keys to the public [46]. In addition, there are
reasons why some CAs should not be trusted. For example, some governments, such as
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Russia and China, have their own CAs that are trusted by most user devices by default,
presenting a conflict of interest between the user and CA in many situations.
2. CAs can sign for any hostname: All CAs are authorized to vouch for the authenticity
of (sign a certificate for) any hostname (e.g., domain name, IP address) [19]. This
includes domains for which certificates are already issued. Hosts do not have control
over which entities are signing certificates for their name, nor are they notified when it
takes place. Thus at any time there may be many different valid certificates signed by
many different CAs for a single domain. A security breach of a single CA can result in
the signing of forged certificates for any domain. Thus TLS authentication is only as
strong as the weakest CA.
3. Flawed implementations are proliferating: The application logic to properly perform
authentication using certificates is not trivial. The number of applications and libraries
implementing secure connectivity via TLS has exploded in recent years, especially in
the mobile space. Studies show that there are a number of implementation flaws that
leave users vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks, e.g., [11, 24, 27]. In many cases
these applications are failing to utilize TLS library calls appropriately, as there are
many important misunderstood nuances regarding validation functions and a severe
lack of sufficient documentation. In other cases application developers fail to even
attempt certificate validation, or turn it off during development and unintentionally
leave it off in production code [25].
These traits make it possible for attackers to perform a TLS MITM attack. This
scenario is illustrated in Figure 1.3. In this case an attacker positions himself in between the
client and server and poses as the legitimate server to the client. The client connects to the
attacker instead of intended host, accepts a forged certificate chain generated by the attacker,
and establishes an encrypted connection with the attacker. Optionally, the attacker also
establishes a TLS connection with the original server as the client would have normally. In
this fashion the attacker is free to read and modify any encrypted traffic being sent between
5

Client

TLS Connect

MITM

Forged Certificate Chain

TLS Connect

Server

Certificate Chain

certificate validation
Key Exchange

Key Exchange
Encrypted Traffic

Encrypted Traffic

Figure 1.3: Example TLS Man-in-the-Middle
the client and server, decrypting and reincrypting traffic as it marshals data between those
endpoints. Note that this behavior is not detectable by the client (or server), as the client
has accepted the forged certificate chain.
Acceptance of the forged chain can occur for a variety of reasons, two of which are
shown in Figure 1.4. In this case, the attacker delivers a substitute certificate for the intended
host, www.google.com, which has been signed by a CA that he has hacked or by his own CA
that he somehow injected into the root store of the victim machine. Since the certificate is
otherwise valid and has a valid signature path to an entity in the root store, it is accepted,
despite the fact that the certificate does not come from Google and that Google actually uses
GeoTrust to sign its certificates.
These attacks are not just theoretical. For example, in 2011 when DigiNotar’s servers
were hacked and more than 500 certificates were fabricated by the intruder, including a
certificate for Gmail that allowed the intruder to access stored email for 300,000 Iranians [39].
This happened despite the fact that Gmail does not use DigiNotar to sign its certificates.
Other CAs have also been hacked, such as Comodo in 2011 and StartCom in 2016 [46, 64],
which left dozens of trusted certificates in the hands of attackers. Note, however, that this is
not needed if the attacker owns his own CA (e.g., a government), has otherwise managed to
infect the root store of the victim machine, or if the targeted application does not perform
correct certificate validation. Furthermore the CA system is further disrupted by the use
of enterprise TLS inspection products, which add a CA to user root stores and MITM

6
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Figure 1.4: Example of substitute certificate acceptance by the client, due to hacked or
injected CAs
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TLS connections (e.g., [1, 10, 14, 54, 59]). Although these solutions are intended to assist
organizations in the protection of their infrastructure and intellectual property, it is unclear
to what extent they follow secure practices or if they allow notification and consent by the
affected users. The use of these products is controversial because browser software still shows
a lock icon during such sessions, misleading users and compromising the end-to-end security
promises made by TLS. Given that there appear to be both benevolent and malicious uses of
the technique of using substitute certificates, we refer to this approach as a TLS proxy.

1.2

Our Study

Unfortunately, very little is known about the prevalence and nature of TLS proxies on the
Internet. There is also no work done to understand what users think about the use of
TLS proxies and under what circumstances their use is acceptable. In this work we use a
two-part study to provide the security community with a better understanding in both of
these areas. In the first part, we provide the community with the results of a measurement
study conducted to obtain quantitative data on TLS proxies on the Internet today. This
work has been published in the following article:
O’Neill, M., Ruoti, S., Zappala, D., & Seamons, K. TLS Proxies: Friend or Foe?
In proceedings of ACM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC), 2016.
In the second part, we report on the results of two surveys conducted to better
understand user attitudes toward TLS proxies. This work has also been published, in the
following article:
Ruoti, S., O’Neill, M., Zappala, D., & Seamons, K. User Attitudes Toward the
Inspection of Encrypted Traffic. In proceedings of Symposium on Usable Privacy
and Security (SOUPS), 2016.
For the measurement portion of our work, we study TLS proxies from the perspective
of the client. A variety of studies have examined the certificate ecosystem by scanning secure
8

servers from a single point of view [18, 20, 30] or using passive monitors from several vantage
points[7, 20]. However, detecting proxies necessitates measurements at the client, and less
work has been done in this space.
Two recent works have found some evidence for TLS proxies by measuring certificates
received by clients. Concurrent with some of our work, Huang et al. measure the prevalence
of TLS proxies that intercept traffic from clients connecting to Facebook [33], finding that
1 in 500 TLS connections are proxied, mostly by corporate Internet filters and personal
antivirus software. In addition, a small number of connections were found to be intercepted
by malware. Because this study uses Flash to detect a certificate mismatch, it does not
detect proxies affecting most mobile devices. The Netalyzer project measured certificates
received by Android apps, assessing 15,000 sessions and identifying just one case of a TLS
proxy running in an analytics app [63]. Though this is a very low rate of prevalence (30 times
less than Huang’s study), the app was found to whitelist several sites, including Facebook.
This indicates that measurements of proxies should examine low-profile sites that are unlikely
to be whitelisted.
We conduct measurements of TLS proxy prevalence using a Flash app deployed
with a Google AdWords campaign. Like Huang, our measurements use Flash to detect a
certificate mismatch without any user interaction. However, we deploy our tool using a
Google AdWords campaign, which affords a number of advantages. First, we are able to
target our measurements toward a server that ordinarily does not receive significant traffic.
This enables us to detect proxies that may intentionally whitelist a popular site such as
Facebook in order to avoid detection. Second, we are able to actively measure clients, based
on how much money we spend on the advertisement, enabling us to collect as many as 12
million measurements in one week by spending $750 per day. Third, we are able to target our
measurements at any country, so that we can measure proxy prevalence in distinct areas of
the world. Fourth, we are able to measure any site that has a permissive Flash socket policy
file. Together, these characteristics give us a broader view of TLS proxies on the Internet.

9

We report on a two-part measurement study of TLS proxies using a Google AdWords
campaign. The first study measures proxies broadly, wherever Google places our advertisement,
comprising 2.9 million certificate tests, with proxied users in 142 countries. This study
measures proxies intercepting traffic to a new server on our campus, which is highly unlikely
to be whitelisted by any proxy. The second part of the measurement study specifically targets
users in five countries (China, Ukraine, Russia, Egypt, and Pakistan) in addition to the world
at large. This covers 12.3 million certificate tests, finding proxied users in 147 countries. In
addition, the second study measures proxies intercepting traffic to twelve sites on the Alexa
top 1 million, in addition to our own server.
Our basic findings are as follows:
• The first part of our measurement study found 11,764 proxied connections out of 2.9
million total measurements (0.41% or approximately 1/250 of all connections) spanning
142 countries. This rate is double that reported by Huang. We found that most
substitute certificates claim to be from benevolent TLS proxies, with 70.87% claiming to
be generated by a firewall software and 12.66% claiming to be generated by a corporate
network.
• The second measurement study, which queried multiple secure hosts, found 50,761 proxied connections out of 12.3 million total measurements (again, 0.41% of all connections)
spanning 147 countries. It is surprising that the overall prevalence is identical in both
studies, which seems to indicate that none of the sites we tested was whitelisted by
proxies.
• Our second measurement study targeted specific countries with the Google AdWords
placement. We find that proxy rates vary significantly with respect to the origin
country of the user. China has an exceptionally low rate of TLS proxies whereas the
United States and other western nations tend to have much higher rates of TLS proxies.
Targeted countries also have a greater rate of unclassifiable TLS proxies that disclose
little to no information about their nature.
10

• In both measurement studies we found numerous instances of negligent and malicious
behavior. Our analysis of one parental filter finds that it masks forged certificates,
allowing an attacker to easily perform a MITM attack against the firewall’s users. In
addition, we found eight malware products affecting over 3,600 connections that install
a new root certificate and act as a TLS proxy to dynamically insert advertisements
on secure sites. We also found evidence that spammers are using TLS proxies in their
products and that botnets may be using this technique. We found numerous other
suspicious circumstances in substitute certificates, such as a null Issuer Organization,
falsified certificate authority signatures, and downgraded public key sizes.
Our surveys examine user understanding and attitude toward the use of TLS proxies.
We surveyed 1,976 people across two surveys regarding their opinions of TLS proxies and their
use in inspecting encrypted traffic. The results of the first survey of 1,049 individuals showed
a surprising willingness by participants to accept the inspection of encrypted traffic, provided
they are first notified. Based on the results of the first survey, we conducted a second survey
of 927 individuals to further explore user attitudes towards inspection of encrypted traffic in
specific situations.
Our contributions from these surveys include the following insights:
• User opinions toward TLS proxies and the inspection of encrypted traffic are nuanced.
Many express concerns about privacy and identity theft from hackers (75.8%) or
government surveillance (70.9%). Yet there is broad, general acceptance of TLS proxies
when used by employers, schools, etc. (71.7%).
• Most participants indicated support for the inspection of encrypted traffic as long as
they were first notified of it (90.7%). Likewise, participants indicated strong support
for legislation requiring notification or consent (83.2%).
• When asked about specific situations in which TLS proxies might be used (e.g., at work,
at school, at a café, or at home), support for TLS proxies ranges from 65% to 90% of
11

participants (including those who want notification or consent). Support for inspection
of encrypted traffic without notification or consent is strongest at elementary schools
(45.9%) and at businesses when employees are using company-provided computers
(47.9%). Participants generally favor consent in cases when they feel in control (at
home, free WiFi, their own device at work) versus notification when an organization is
in control (public library, school, company computer). In nearly all the scenarios we
posed, only a small minority of the participants indicated that using TLS proxies is not
acceptable. The one exception is government surveillance, in which case 47.5% say that
this is not acceptable.
• Many users would have a negative opinion if they discovered that the owner of their
network used a TLS proxy without prior notification and/or consent (60.8%), though
for some (34.2%) it would depend on who the owner was and how they were using the
technology. Some would change their behavior on the network, either discontinuing to
use it (17.2%) or changing which sites they visited (6%).
• We identify personas based on participants’ responses regarding TLS proxies: pragmatic
(76.5%), privacy fundamentalist (17.0%), jaded (5.0%), and unconcerned (1.0%). Jaded
participants are interesting in that their opinions regarding privacy and security align
with the privacy fundamentalist persona, but their practices align with the unconcerned
persona. This dichotomy stems from the fact that these users feel that regardless
of what steps they take, they are powerless to prevent compromise of their online
information, and so choose to not do anything to protect themselves.
While several of our findings might seem intuitive, it is important to ground intuitions in data, and this work provides the first survey of user opinions on this topic. In
addition, participants showed a high level of engagement in the survey, notwithstanding the
complexity of the topic. Many users shared in-depth analysis of trade-offs in open responses,
demonstrating that they care deeply about this issue. User attitudes toward TLS proxies
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provide an important data point along the spectrum of discussion that is currently taking
place regarding who should have access to encrypted information.
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Part II

Measurements
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Chapter 2
The Measurement Tool

We have developed a tool to measure the prevalence of TLS proxies using existing,
widely-deployed technologies. The tool runs silently from the perspective of the user; no
user action is required, either to install any software or to interact with the tool. This is a
significant advantage as compared to other work that requires client-side software installation
[4–6, 31, 46, 65].

2.1

Design

To meet our objective of using existing browser technologies without requiring further client
installation, we take advantage of the widespread deployment and transparency afforded
by the Adobe Flash runtime. By hosting a Flash application on a web page the server can
upload it to a visiting client, which runs it without any user interaction. Our tool works by
sending a ClientHello message to a TLS-enabled server and recording the ServerHello
and Certificate messages received in response. The retrieved certificates are then sent to a
reporting server for analysis. This process is handled in three steps, illustrated in Figure 2.1:
1. Retrieve measurement tool. The client browser connects to the Distribution Server,
where the Flash application is hosted. The application need not be physically visible to
the user and can merely be embedded in the background of an otherwise normal web
page or be imported through some means such as an HTML iframe. The web page
data, along with the embedded Flash application, is then downloaded by the client.
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Distribution Server
Browser: HTTP Request
1

HTTP Response with page, resources, Flash tool

Client
2

Send ClientHello
Recv ServerHello

ClientHello
TLS Proxy?

Recv Certificate

Target Server(s)

ServerHello
Certificate
Report Server

3

Send Server Hello Data and Certificate Chain

Figure 2.1: Flash TLS Proxy Measurement Tool
2. Record certificate. The Flash tool is run automatically by the browser. The tool is
designed to perform a series of experiments one for each Target Server to be queried.
Target Servers are the hosts to be probed when detecting the presence of a TLS proxy
between hosts and the client machine. For each experiment, the application issues
a ClientHello message to the relevant Target Server to initiate a TLS handshake,
which triggers a TLS handshake from either the actual Target Server or a TLS proxy,
if present.
3. Report results. As the Target Servers (or TLS proxy) respond to this TLS session
initiation, the application records the ServerHello and Certificate messages received. Each partial TLS connection is terminated before the handshake completes and
before any actual data is transmitted between the two endpoints. For each completed
experiment (Target Server), the tool reports these results to the Report Server using
an HTTP POST request. The Reporting Server then compares the certificate received
with the expected original, the date, and the IP address of the POST request.
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The Distribution Server, Target Servers, and Report Server need not be distinct for
the tool to function properly. In fact, a single host may take on all three roles if desired. For
example, a website administrator seeking to detect TLS proxies between her website and her
end users need only do the following:
1. Host the Flash application on the web server and invoke it from desired webpages.
The tool can be deployed transparently within existing web pages with no visible changes.
In addition, the tool can be imported through other means in HTML from a single
location, which may be useful for administrators with large applications spread across
multiple servers or via a content-distribution network seeking to detect TLS proxies.
2. Host a simple socket policy file on the Target Server. For security reasons the
Flash runtime (since Flash 9.0) requires that applications attempting to establish a
TCP connection with a remote host first obtain permission from that host via a simple
policy file. The request for this file is sent automatically by the Flash runtime. The
software to host such a file is extremely simple and easily deployed. This particular
security feature of Flash prohibits the tool from testing client connections to arbitrary
Target Servers; all hosts tested must first grant permission through their respective
socket policy files. For our website, we serve our socket policy file on the same port used
by our web server (80 or 443). This reduces the effect of captive portals, which often
block traffic targeting ports other than those used by HTTP and HTTPS (e.g., airport
public access WiFi). Our socket policy server, implemented as an Apache module, is
provided on our website along with links to other standalone implementations.
The contents of a sample socket policy file are shown in the listing below. We note for
best practices that system administrators should take care to ensure that their socket policy
files are not too permissive. That is, they should only allow connections from applications
served by hosts they recognize and only to ports on which they are prepared to accept the
associated traffic. For administrators of secure websites, this means that the domain attribute
17

on line 4 can be set to the domain of the site itself (or wherever the Flash application
is hosted) and that the to-ports attribute on the same line can be set to 443 (HTTPS).
If additional TLS services are run on the host the to-ports value can be extended using
comma-delimited port numbers of the other services. Additional domains can also be granted
connect permissions by adding lines similar to line 4 with the additional hostnames for their
domain values. For both the domain and to-port attributes, a wildcard value of * is also
allowed (though not recommended).
1 <? xml version = " 1.0 " ? >
2 < cross - domain - policy >
3

< site - control permitted - cross - domain - policies = " master - only " / >

4

< allow - access - from domain = " example . com " to - ports = " 443 " / >

5 </ cross - domain - policy >

In addition to the recommendations for the socket policy file, we also suggest that
website administrators wishing to use this TLS proxy detection long-term enhance it with
modern obfuscation techniques. As this method of detection becomes more well-known, the
likelihood increases of a TLS proxy accounting for its use and either blocking its queries or
allowing them to transit without modification. We leave these obfuscation techniques to the
interested implementer, as their usefulness is inversely proportional to their notoriety.

2.2

Implementation

To implement our tool it was necessary to retrieve the certificate used during a TLS handshake.
It would have been preferable to use JavaScript or HTML5 to retrieve the certificate used as
part of a current TLS connection, but unfortunately there is no API available for this. Firefox
allows a plugin to request the certificate, but plugins require manual client installation. This
left us with the alternative of establishing a plain TCP connection with the target server and
then initiating a TLS handshake. Unfortunately, the ability to use a plain TCP connection
rules out the use of HTML5 WebSockets.
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Due to these constraints, we opted to use the Adobe Flash platform. Java web plugins
also fit the requirements, but lacked the widespread install base of Adobe Flash. Beginning
with version 11.0 of the Flash runtime, Adobe made available a SecureSockets API that
allows developers to access certificate data from a TLS connection. However, these versions of
Flash were too recent to enjoy the reported 98.9% desktop market penetration of Flash 9.0 [2].
Thus we implemented our tool in ActionScript using only libraries supported by the Flash 9.0
runtime. Using the Socket API provided by Flash 9.0 we implemented functionality required
to perform a partial TLS handshake. After receiving the full Certificate message from the
Target Server the handshake is aborted and the connection is closed. The Flash application
records and parses all certificates in the chain received from the Certificate message (as
some hosts offer certificate chains) and stores them locally until it parses the final one. All
certificate data, in PEM format, is concatenated and then sent as an HTTP POST request
to Report Server for analysis. The Reporting Server hosts a MySQL database and simple
PHP application responsible for receiving the POST request and storing the data contained
within it. This request is performed using the Socket API as well.
Code for the Flash measurement tool, socket policy server, and collected datasets are
available for download at tlsresearch.byu.edu.

2.3

Limitations

Our tool is unable to measure TLS proxies being used against most mobile devices. An
overwhelming majority of mobile platforms do not support Flash and Adobe has discontinued
their development of Flash for mobile devices. Our tool is likewise unable to measure TLS
proxies being used against browsers that use ad blocking technology.
In addition, it is possible that TLS proxies could be engineered to circumvent our
measurements. At the time of our study, our measurement methodology was not well known,
so it is unlikely that any attacker was evading detection or tampering with our reports.
However, in the case that this methodology becomes well-known, it would be difficult to
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prevent dedicated attackers from modifying their TLS proxies to avoid our measurements.
Interested parties are referred to modern obfuscation practices if they wish to make a more
stealthy detection tool.
Finally, we note that since the Target Servers must host a permissive socket policy file
to function, only hosts that are controlled by the experimenter or those that have wildcard
permissive socket policies are able to be scanned. However, we do note that in our experience
most of the hosts that serve a socket policy file have very permissive policies already.
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Chapter 3
Google AdWords Campaigns

To achieve rapid and widespread deployment of our measurement tool we leveraged
the Google AdWords platform. This strategy for using an advertising campaign to conduct
an end-user measurement study has previously been used to study CSRF attacks [9], DNS
rebinding attacks [36], and DNSSEC deployment [34, 35, 44]. Our study is the first to use this
same method to measure the deployment of TLS proxies. The results from this study shed
light on the legitimate demand for TLS proxies as well as several suspicious or duplicitous
practices.
For deployment on an advertisement network, the ad servers themselves constitute
the Distribution Server in our architecture found in Figure 2.1. The Target Server was set as
our own website, tlsresearch.byu.edu, for the first study and a variety of other hosts for
the second study, listed later. Finally, the Report Server was hosted on the same machine
as our website and used a simple PHP application and a MySQL database for storing the
certificate chains reported back from clients.
To accommodate placement in advertisements, our measurement tool was modified to
contain a visible canvas on which we place a simplistic advertisement for our research lab.
Figure 3.1 shows the advertisement as it appeared to web users during our measurement
study. In this configuration, the Flash tool also bears a clickTAG, code that links an Flash
advertisement to the advertiser’s landing page, required by many advertisement networks.
For this work, the clickTAG referred users who opted to click our ad back to our website,
tlsresearch.byu.edu. We also replaced the random numbers used by the TLS handshake
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Figure 3.1: Appearance of tool via Google AdWords
code with static values, as some ad networks block Flash advertisements that use random
number generators. Our measurement tool was run as soon as the browser loaded the
advertisement, and required no interaction from users.
For our ad campaigns we leveraged the CPM (cost-per-impression) bidding model for
our campaign, which maximizes the number of unique clients presented with our ad. We set
the Max. CPM to $10 USD. To help us reach a global audience we indicated that our ad
should be served to all locations and languages. Additionally, since ads are shown only on
websites that match a set of designated keywords we selected our keywords based on phrases
that were currently trending globally on Google Trends [29]. We set our ad to show uniformly
throughout the day so as to collect data from users in a variety of locations and situations
(e.g., home, commuting, work).
Along with the certificate, we also recorded the IP address of the client tested. This
IP address was then used to query the MaxMind GeoLite [48] database to gather geolocation
information.

3.1

Campaign Setup for First Measurement Study

Our initial Google AdWords advertising campaign ran from January 6, 2014 to January 30,
2014. During the first 17 days of the study we varied the amount of money allocated to
the ad campaign, but for the last week we kept it at $500/day. In this study we gathered
certificate data for our own website, tlsresearch.byu.edu, using it as the Target Server.
We used the following keywords for the study: Nelson Mandela, Sports, Basketball, NSA,
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Internet, Freedom, Paul Walker, Security, LeBron James, Haiyan, Snowden, PlayStation 4,
Miley Cyrus, Xbox One, and iPhone 5s.
This campaign generated 4,634,386 impressions and 3,897 clicks (not required to
complete the measurement) at a cost of $4,911.97. In total we completed 2,861,244 successful
measurements.
Chapter 4 discusses the results from this study.

3.2

Campaign Setup for Second Measurement Study

To increase the number of measurements collected and to better understand the nature of
TLS proxies we conducted a second set of measurements approximately eight months after
the first study.
One question unanswered by the first study was whether TLS proxies were intercepting
all traffic, or whether they selectively intercepted traffic according to white or blacklists. To
shed light on this subject, we decided to gather measurements for different types of sites:
• Popular: Sites from the Alexa top 25,000. Six websites were included in this category.
• Business: Commercial sites unlikely to be blocked by places of business. Five websites
were included in this category.
• Pornographic: Pornographic websites (expected to be blocked by parental filters and
places of business). Five websites are included in this category.
• Authors’: The single website operated by the authors and also used in the first
measurement study.
The policy restrictions of the Flash runtime prohibit establishment of socket connections to arbitrary hosts. Thus all sites used in our study had to host permissive socket policy
files that allowed connections to port 443 from any domain. We scanned for the presence of
permissive socket policy files on the entirety of the Alexa top 1 million websites, and selected
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Top 25,000
qq.com
promodj.com
idwebgame.com
parsnews.com
idgameland.com
vcp.ir

Website
Business

Porn

airdroid.com
webhost1.ru
restaurantesecia.com.br
speedtest.net.in
iprank.ir

pornclipstv.com
porno-be.com
pornbasetube.com
pornozip.net
pornorasskazov.net

Table 3.1: Website types probed in second measurement study
the highest ranked such websites for each type to use in the second measurement. Table 3.1
lists the additional hosts we probed.
At most 12 of these sites were queried by a single served instance of our Flash
measurement tool. Due to differences in Internet connectivity quality and hardware and
software performance, not all clients served with our ad were able to successfully perform
experiments with all hosts. The tool was configured to first test the connection to the authors’
website, before attempting to perform other experiments on other hosts.
In this second study, we also targeted specific countries by creating an additional ad
campaigns. The ad image used in both the global and country specific ad campaigns was the
same. Some of the countries we wanted to target were unavailable in Google AdWords (e.g.,
Iran, Syria) and after discussion we settled on the following five countries: China, Egypt,
Pakistan, Russia, and Ukraine.
The second study ran from October 8, 2014 4:00 PM MDT to October 15, 2014 4:00 PM
MDT. The budget for the global campaign was $500/day and the country-specific campaigns
were $50/day. We used the following keywords for the study: Nelson Mandela, Sports, Internet
Security, Basketball, Football, Freedom, NCAA, Paul Walker, Boston Marathon, Election,
North Korea, Harlem Shake, PlayStation 4, Royal Baby, Cory Monteith, iPhone 6, iPhone 5s,
Samsung Galaxy S4, iPhone 6 Plus, and TLS Proxies.
The breakdown of costs and results are given in Table 3.2. In total we completed
12,314,756 successful measurements.
Chapter 5 discusses the results from this second study.
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Campaign

Impressions

Click

Cost

Global
China
Egypt
Pakistan
Russia
Ukraine

3,285,598
689,233
232,218
183,849
230,474
364,868

5,424
652
1,777
2,536
203
294

$4,021.78
$401.41
$378.17
$378.26
$401.36
$390.69

Total

5,079,298

11,077

$6,090.19

Table 3.2: Second Study Statistics
3.3

Limiting Risk

When utilizing the Flash measurement tool to perform experiments on different Target Servers,
there are some risks to users that need to be addressed. First we note that the existence of
permissive Flash socket policies on Target Hosts, which are required for the tool to function,
are an explicit indication from administrators that connections from our tool are allowed.
However, since the tool transparently queries the Target Server from users’ machines, we
must consider protecting users themselves from potential harm. For example, since browsing
gambling and pornographic websites is a forbidden practice on many company campuses, and
even against the law in some jurisdictions, proper care must be taken to avoid unnecessary
risk to users when Target Servers fall into these categories. Given that interaction with users
is not possible when distributing the tool through an advertisement network (often both
technically infeasible as well as against terms of service), it is not possible to obtain user
consent in such a situation. This is common in many Internet measurement scenarios. To
mitigate the risk to users in our Ad Campaign study, we employ the following precautions:
• Breadcrumbing: We force the tool to first connect to our Target Server before
attempting any additional experiments. Our Target Server provides a webpage for
curious users and network monitors to obtain information on our experiments. If network
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administrators were to investigate this traffic by visiting our web server, they would be
shown a description of our research and provided with our contact information1 .
• Connection Termination: Since the tool is only interested in certificates sent by the
Target Server (or TLS proxy intercepting the connection), we abort the TLS connection
after we have received this data. Furthermore, we abort the TLS handshake itself,
making it clear to network monitors that no connection was actually established to the
Target Server.
• No Data Transfer: As a result of our early TLS handshake termination, no website
content of any kind is ever transferred from the Target Server to the client. This further
illustrates to network monitors that users are not actually visiting the Target Server,
as browsers automatically download content once a connection is established.
The primary benefit of this methodology is that the security community can become
rapidly aware, at a global scale, of the nature and prevalence of TLS proxies. Knowledge of
TLS proxies in the wild, both benevolent and malicious, is traditionally very difficult to obtain.
Distribution of our tool through an advertisement network is a cost-effective, large-scale,
measurement option to shed light on practices that subvert authentication guarantees of the
most common security protocol on the Internet. This and Huang’s work [33] has informed the
community about these practices and motivated a subsequent study that identified weaknesses
in personal firewalls [17].
Finally, our tool complies with Google AdWords’ terms of service. Use of our tool
through other advertisement networks or distributions should be preceded by a thorough
investigation of applicable terms of service.
1

We were never contacted.
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3.4

Ethical Considerations

When first attempting to publish the results of our measurement studies in the 2015 ACM
Internet Measurement Conference, we unfortunately neglected to include a discussion of
ethics. As a result, the discussion of our risk minimization techniques was also omitted. This
omission was met with some concern by two responsible anonymous reviewers (RA and RB),
who issued the following two remarks.
the critical problem with this paper is the lack of an ethics statement and the lack
of IRB approval. I’m willing to accept that the first experiment was harmless, i.e.
having clients connect to a benign server controlled by the researchers. However,
the second experiment has the potential for harm, since users were sending packets
to pornographic sites without their knowledge. –RA
I have ethical concerns over how the study was conducted. While there likely
isn’t much harm in visiting an innocuous website, or a website associated with
the research group, the ad does make it look like the user visited the website, in
the case of a censored website or pornographic site, the proxy might be in place
for the purpose of checking for this activity. For example, imagine a company
policy that prohibits viewing pornographic material in the workplace. This user
now has connected to a prohibited site from their browser. Unfortunately the
authors have no discussion of these risks. –RB
A subsequent submission included a discussion of ethics and removed the results from
the second measurement study as an additional precaution. This second submission was
accepted. However, we wished to gain further insight into the ethical issues encountered by
the work in our second measurement study. In response to the initial reviewer criticism we
held informal talks with our IRB. The IRB indicated that our study would likely be exempt
from review because 1) our methodology probed servers rather than downloading content
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from them, 2) we took steps to minimize risk, and 3) there was no possibility to allow for
user consent. The inability to obtain user consent is common in Internet measurement work.
The networking community is still in the process of developing ethical standards
related to Internet measurement broadly. A recent paper by Burnett et al. was controversial
because they measured online censorship using a method that caused users to visit sites likely
to be blocked by censoring technology [13]. In this case, measurements were not limited to
probes; the measuring software tried to download content, without user consent, to see if
the attempt would be blocked. The paper was published with a note from the SIGCOMM
program committee indicating that they did not approve of the methodology. Subsequently,
a paper by Jones et al. [37] discussed these ethical issues, finding that Internet censorship
measurements “fall into an ethical grey area”, due to the lack of true relation to human
subjects research, and the difficulty in evaluating the degree of risk. The paper includes the
opinion that measurements that use probes below the application layer are clearly preferable
to those that download content.
In dicussing these ethical issues with colleagues, we conclude that the networking
community’s best current guideline is that risk is effectively mitigated if measurements consist
of probes that are sent at a low rate. We believe our methodology sufficiently mitigates
risk by only probing, rather than completing a TLS handshake or downloading content. We
note that our tool operates very similarly to typical advertisements on the web, in the sense
that they force browsers to connect to websites not solicited by the user. Given that this is
common on the web, network observers are less likely to hold users accountable for every host
their machines contact. However, we acknowledge that unconstrained use of our methodology
may not fall within the realm of ethical behavior. As such, we provide the following list of
recommendations for future researchers embarking on similar studies:
• Careful Target Selection: When selecting the target hosts for a measurement,
carefully evaluate the nature of each host in the context of the societal norms and civil
regulations of affected users. In this step, it is important to not include a host that may
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adversely affect the legal standing or reputation of users affected by the measurement.
Note specifically that in some jurisdictions with less civil rights, some users may be
considered guilty until proven innocent. Furthermore, even seemingly innocuous hosts
in one jurisdiction may be illegal or inappropriate to visit in others. This extends
to different environments within a single jurisdiction as well (e.g., company policies
may differ from personal ones). We note that, if doing our study again, our second
measurement study would have omitted the probes to pornographic websites, especially
in jurisdictions where legal action is potentially taken against those who view such
material.
• Brevity: Abort connections as quickly as possible. Once the data pertinent to the
study has been obtained, minimize potential risks to users by severing the connection
immediately. This reduces user risk by minimizing the window of opportunity for
measurement tools to trigger network alarms, while also informing any network observers
that the connection was not likely caused by normal human interaction. For example,
the network trace for an employee visiting a prohibited website and immediately closing
the browser is drastically different from a local measurement tool aborting a connection
to that same website and prematurely terminating the TLS handshake.
• Publicity: Where possible, provide network observers with easy paths to identify the
purpose and true origin of the traffic patterns generated by the measurement tool. This
allows network monitors to place blame for any prohibited connections on the tool
rather than the user. Note that, unless it is strictly necessary for the experiment, we
do not recommend attempting to camouflage measurement traffic in any way, as it may
subject users to undue suspicion if uncovered.
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Chapter 4
First Measurement Study

Our first measurement study was targeted at a general, global audience. During the
duration of this ad campaign, we served 4.36 million ads and successfully completed 2.86
million measurements. Of those tests, 11,764 returned a different X.509 certificate than was
served by our secure web server, indicating the presence of a TLS proxy.
The users behind a proxied connection that were identified by our campaign originated
in 142 countries and from 8,589 distinct IP addresses. Due to the targeting algorithms used by
Google AdWords, our tool’s exposure to these countries is not uniformly distributed. Table 4.1
shows the countries with the most proxied connections in our study. For each country, the
table lists the total number of proxied connections, the total number of connections, and
the percentage of total connections to that country that were proxied. Some countries have
significantly higher percentages of proxied connections than the average, including France
(1.09%), Canada (0.87%), Belgium (0.81%), the United States (0.79%), and Romania (0.74%).
Together, connections from the United States and Brazil account for 36% of detected proxies.

4.1

Analysis of Issuer Organization

We first analyze the contents of the Issuer Organization in the substitute certificates we
collected. We use openssl to decode the certificates and store them in a database, where
we can run queries. We also manually inspect the contents of the relevant fields to identify
the issuing organization and their software products, using web searches to determine their
identity. We emphasize that our results in this section are based on the intercepting proxy
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Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Country

Proxied

Total

Percent

France
Canada
Belgium
US
Romania
Brazil
Portugal
India
Turkey
S.Korea
Russia
Spain
Japan
Netherlands
UK
Germany
Ukraine
Taiwan
Poland
Italy
Other (215)

812
303
136
2,252
696
2,041
185
302
303
196
224
226
111
104
759
499
160
101
182
200
1,972

74,789
34,695
16,816
285,078
94,116
298,618
29,799
51,348
65,195
46,660
58,402
62,569
31,751
31,938
259,971
187,805
61,431
61,195
110,550
129,358
869,096

1.09%
0.87%
0.81%
0.79%
0.74%
0.68%
0.62%
0.59%
0.46%
0.42%
0.38%
0.36%
0.35%
0.33%
0.29%
0.27%
0.26%
0.17%
0.16%
0.15%
0.23%

Total

11,764

2,861,180

0.41%

Table 4.1: Proxied connections by country, ordered by percentage proxied
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Rank

Issuer Organization

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Bitdefender
PSafe Tecnologia S.A.
Sendori Inc
ESET spol. s r. o.
Null
Kaspersky Lab ZAO
Fortinet
Kurupira.NET
POSCO
Qustodio
WebMakerPlus Ltd
Southern Company Services
NordNet
Target Corporation
DigiCert Inc
ContentWatch, Inc.
NetSpark, Inc.
Sweesh LTD
IBRD
Cloud Services
Other (332)

Connections
4,788
1,200
966
927
829
589
310
267
167
109
95
62
61
52
49
42
42
39
26
23
1,121

Table 4.2: Issuer Organization field values
self-identifying itself in the certificate. It is certainly possible that malicious proxies have
hidden their tracks by masquerading as a legitimate organization in the Issuer Organization
field, and we cannot detect this.
Table 4.2 shows the values for the Issuer Organization field of the substitute certificates.
Table 4.3 provides a breakdown of values present in the Issuer Organization field of the
substitute certificates. The majority of certificates from proxied connections have an Issuer
Organization field matching the name of a personal or enterprise firewall (69.54%). Another
12.66% have the name of an organization set as the Issuer Organization (e.g., Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, Lincoln Financial Group). Additionally, 7% (829) of the
substitute certificates have null values for the Issuer Organization field.
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Proxy Type
Business/Personal Firewall
Organization
Malware
Unknown
Parental Control
Business Firewall
Certificate Authority
School
Personal Firewall
Telecom

Connections

Percent

8,101
1,394
1,112
840
156
69
49
32
11
0

68.86%
12.66%
8.65%
7.14%
1.33%
0.59%
0.42%
0.27%
0.09%
0%

Table 4.3: Classification of claimed issuer, ordered by proxy share
The most suspicious activities discovered were revealed by certificates with an Issuer
Organization that matched the names of malware. Sendori, Inc, WebMakerPlus Ltd, and
IopFailZeroAccessCreate appeared in 966, 95, and 21 Issuer Organization fields, respectively.
Sendori poses as a legitimate enterprise, however they produce software that compromises
the DNS lookup of infected machines, allowing them to redirect users to improper hosts. A
TLS proxy component is used to bypass host authenticity warnings in the browser. The
substitute certificates generated by the TLS proxy are signed by a root authority that was
added to the root store of the local machine at the time of infection. Substitute certificates
issued by Sendori originated from 30 distinct countries.
The WebMakerPlus malware is primarily associated with inserting advertisements
into Web pages. We hypothesize that WebMakerPlus uses a TLS proxy to simulate that
their advertisements are served from a secure connection and to modify secure pages in
transit to include such content. Substitute certificates containing markings for WebMakerPlus
originated from 16 distinct countries.
Manual Internet queries revealed that malware was responsible for an Issuer Common
Name field value of IopFailZeroAccessCreate. The certificates containing this value originated
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from 14 distinct countries. Disturbingly, each certificate contained the same 512-bit public
key. This malware was also reported by [33].
It is somewhat surprising that these malware programs self-identify in the substitute
certificates they generate, as an attacker can arbitrarily select values for the fields in a
substitute certificate.
In addition to malware discoveries, we found that the names of two companies highly
associated with spam were also present in numerous Issuer Organization fields. The names
Sweesh LTD, and AtomPark Software Inc were found in 39 and 20 substitute certificates,
respectively. AtomPark offers tools for spammers including “email extractors” and “bulk
mailers”. Sweesh offers services to spammers to overcome “hurdles” faced by advertisers and
publishers. Internet searches reveal that Sweesh may be responsible for the development of
WebMakerPlus.
Not all of the root certificates found in the collected substitute chains were unique. In
the 11,764 substitute chains 8,341 distinct roots were found. For example, 310 leaf certificates
signed by Fortinet all used the same root certificate, and these were obtained from 155 distinct
IP addresses. This behavior was consistent across many of the popular issuers identified
(e.g., POSCO, Southern Company Services, Target Corporation). These organizations are
likely using a single root to sign intermediate certificates and then deploying these at various
endpoints where they operate TLS proxies.

4.2

Negligent Behavior

Where possible, we installed and characterized personal firewall software from many of the
most common companies whose names were provided in the Issuer Organization, Issuer
Organizational Unit, and Issuer Common Name fields of our collected certificates. We
characterized the behavior of these solutions when running behind our own TLS proxy which
issued certificates signed by an untrusted CA. While most solutions properly rejected our
forged certificates, Kurupira, a parental filter that is responsible for 267 proxied connections
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in our dataset, did not. When visiting google.com and gmail.com, Kurupira replaced
our untrusted certificate with a signed trusted one, thus allowing attackers to perform a
transparent man-in-the-middle attack against Kurupira users without having to compromise
root stores. In contrast, BitDefender not only blocked this forged certificate, but also blocked
a forged certificate that resolved to a new root we installed in the victim machine’s root store.
Among the negligent behavior we found are TLS proxies that generate substitute
certificates with weak cryptographic strength. Our original certificate has a public key size of
2048 bits. However, we find that 5,951 (50.59%) substitute certificates have public key sizes
of 1024 bits and 21 certificates have public key sizes of 512 bits. 23 (0.20%) TLS proxies
generated substitute certificates that used MD5 for signing, 21 (0.18%) which were also 512
bit keys. Interestingly, some TLS proxies generated certificates that have better cryptographic
strength than our certificate. Seven (0.06%) used certificates with a key size of 2432 and five
(0.04%) used SHA-256 for signing.
In addition to problems with cryptographic strength, we discovered that 49 (0.42%)
substitute certificates claim to be signed by DigiCert, though none of them actually are. The
original certificate from our secure web server is issued by DigiCert High Assurance CA-3,
indicating the TLS proxy likely copied this field when creating the substitute. It is alarming
that a TLS proxy would opt to copy this field, as it signifies a masquerading as the legitimate
authority. It is possible that these proxies are operated by malicious individuals doing their
best to not be detected by the user.
Finally, we note that 110 substitute certificates have modifications to the subject field.
For 51 (0.43%) certificates, the subject did not match our website’s domain. In many cases
a wildcarded IP address was used that only designated the subnet of our website. In two
cases the substitute certificate is issued to the wrong domain entirely: mail.google.com
and urs.microsoft.com. These certificates appear to be legitimate for those domains and
properly validate back to GeoTrust and Cybertrust roots, respectively.
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Chapter 5
Second Measurement Study

During the second ad campaign we successfully completed 12.3 million measurements
targeting five specific countries as well as the world in general. Of those tests, 50,761 returned
a different X.509 certificate than was served by the authoritative host.

5.1

Analysis of Issuer Organization

Table 5.1 contains the breakdown of Issuer Organization fields from our second measurement
study. As in our first measurement study, we find that the majority of TLS proxies claim to
be features of firewall solutions (74.42%). Organization and school names are also prevalent,
accounting for another 6.01% of Issuer Organization values. However, we see an increase
in the relative popularity of the Unknown category as compared to the first study (10.75%
from 7.14%). The Unknown category comprises certificates with null or blank issuer fields,
or otherwise uncategorizable values. In tandem with this finding we note that the Malware
category has decreased in relative popularity from 8.65% to 5.06%. These results were
obtained largely from our five targeted countries. The increase in the Unknown category of
TLS proxies in these countries is particularly alarming. It is possible that malware using
TLS proxy features in these regions is more opaque than its earlier counterparts, opting not
to disclose its identity through Issuer Organization fields. Even if this is not the case, it is
alarming to note that TLS proxies may be decreasing their already-poor visibility to users in
those countries.
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Proxy Type
Business/Personal Firewall
Unknown
Organization
Malware
Business Firewall
Personal Firewall
School
Telecom
Parental Control
Certificate Authority

Connections

Percent

36,005
5,455
3,531
2,571
1,231
536
482
447
428
68

70.93%
10.75%
6.96%
5.06%
2.43%
1.06%
0.95%
0.88%
0.84%
0.13%

Table 5.1: Classification of claimed issuer, ordered by proxy share (2nd study)
Another distinguishing feature of our second study’s Issuer Organization fields is the
presence of the names of Telecom companies in the dataset. We found 375 proxied connections
from IP addresses owned by a Korean telecom company, LG UPLUS. Another four telecom
company names were reported from an additional 72 connections. It is unclear whether LG
UPLUS and the other companies are using TLS proxies within their own office buildings or
using them to intercept the traffic of their own users. The latter behavior is not without
precedent; Nokia has recently come under fire for such an operation [51].

5.2

Proxy prevalence by specific country

Our second measurement study via AdWords contained six mini-campaigns. Five of these
targeted the countries of China, Ukraine, Russia, Egypt, and Pakistan. These countries
were selected for their contemporary civil struggles and their respective governments’ stance
on free speech. The final mini-campaign targeted the world in general. Table 5.2 shows a
breakdown of the number of connections tested per country. We immediately see that all five
specific countries targeted by our campaign lie within the top six most-prevalent countries,
showing the dependability of Google AdWords’ country targeting feature. We also note the
relatively low percentage of TLS-proxied traffic from China. Before this study the authors

37

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Country

Proxied

Total

Percent

Romania
US
Brazil
UK
Japan
India
Germany
Egypt
Italy
Turkey
Indonesia
Pakistan
Russia
Greece
Poland
Czech Rep.
Taiwan
Ukraine
Korea
China
Other (209)

2,210
3,327
1,889
2,056
2,033
716
1,091
3,720
737
1,975
798
1,890
4,532
516
456
343
530
4,329
1,722
563
15,328

185,749
385,811
232,454
266,873
273,532
102,869
177,586
660,937
145,438
411,962
181,971
456,792
1,116,341
130,613
127,806
110,170
186,942
1,575,053
836,556
2,549,301
2,200,000

1.19%
0.86%
0.81%
0.77%
0.74%
0.70%
0.61%
0.56%
0.50%
0.48%
0.44%
0.41%
0.40%
0.40%
0.36%
0.31%
0.28%
0.27%
0.21%
0.02%
0.70%

Total

50,761

12,314,756

0.41%

Table 5.2: Proxied connections by country, ordered by percentage proxied (2nd study)
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Figure 5.1: Heat-map of TLS proxy prevalence by country. Highest = 12% proxy rate, lowest
= 0% proxy rate
Website Type

Connections

Proxied

Percent Proxied

Popular
Business
Pornographic
Authors’

5,132,342
1,787,875
3,004,996
2,353,717

20,965
7,494
12,458
9,844

0.41%
0.42%
0.41%
0.42%

Table 5.3: Proxied connection breakdown by host type
hypothesized that this country would have a high amount of TLS-proxied traffic due to its
stance on civil liberties and government surveillance. We also find that Ukraine, Russia,
Egypt and Pakistan all have a lower TLS-proxy percentage than western nations such as the
United States (0.86%) and the UK (0.77%). This may be due to the fact that most detected
firewall solutions are of western origin and western install base. Thus it is possible that the
general lower proxy rates in our target countries is due more to consumer choice and buying
power. If true, this would also give some validity to the claimed issuer fields, which include
the names of firewall solutions.
The relative prevalence of TLS proxies by country is visualized in Figure 5.1. Low
TLS-proxy rates are signified by blue and gradually transition to red with increasing proxy
rate. The map includes connection data from our second study in 228 countries and territories.
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5.3

Proxy behavior by type of host

The augmented measurement tool used in our second study connected to various types of
hosts: popular, business, pornographic, and our own. The breakdown of the prevalence of
TLS proxies with respect to each host type is shown in Table 5.3 (note that the number
of connections to each type of host varies due to the variances in network conditions and
computer performance of our users and of the hosts themselves). The percentage of proxied
traffic to each type of host is nearly identical. We also find that individual TLS proxies are
also indiscriminate in their behavior toward these types of hosts. These results suggest that
TLS proxies do not employ blacklists when deciding which traffic to intercept. Given Huang
et al.’s finding of a 0.20% TLS-proxy rate for Facebook connections, there is some evidence to
suggest that at least some TLS proxies are employing whitelists when determining whether
to intercept a connection. Facebook’s popularity far exceeds the popularity of our chosen
popular hosts (we were constrained to hosts which served permissive Flash socket policy
files), so sites akin to it are in a class of their own. It is possible that many benevolent TLS
proxies are configured to ignore extremely popular websites run by reputable organizations,
perhaps to preserve some privacy and reduce performance overhead.

5.4

More malware

Our second study revealed a continued presence of malware in the TLS proxy space. All of
our previously discovered malware was also present in our second study, with an additional
five discoveries: issuer fields containing the values Objectify Media Inc (1069 connections),
Superfish, Inc. (610 connections), WiredTools LTD (131 connections), Internet Widgits Pty
Ltd (67 connections), and ImpressX OU (16 connections). Web research indicated that all
these are malware products and one of them, Internet Widgits Pty Ltd, has ties to a botnet.
These malware, combined with new instances of the malware exposed previously, accounted
for 2,571 of proxied connections in our second study.
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One suspicious Issuer Organization field was kowsar. Certificates with this identifier
appeared 268 times, and were retrieved by 266 unique IP addresses. Unlike other Issuer
Organizations we found, this identifier did not appear to be associated with a large organization
(which would indicate a corporate firewall) or a personal firewall product. The IP addresses
given this certificate are from numerous countries around the world and from many different
ISPs. Contrast this with the Certificate Issuer DSP, which appeared 204 times, but with only
one IP. In this case, DSP is being used by the Department of Social and Family Affairs (also
called the Department of Social Protection), Ireland, and thus likely represents a corporate
firewall. The pattern for kowsar is indicative of either a popular personal firewall or an active
attack such as a botnet.
Similar oddities appear, but on a smaller scale. For example, the Certificate Issuer
field Information Technology appeared 33 times, covering 3 IP addresses. These IPs were
from a Japanese chemical company, an ISP in Netherlands, and a chapter of the American
Red Cross. These are such disparate organizations that this looks like suspicious behavior,
though it is possible that each of these organizations set up a corporate firewall and chose
the same name for the certificate they generated. The Issuer field MYInternetS appeared
36 times from 6 different ISPs. Five of these are in Denmark, from a variety of ISPs and a
university, yet one is from a cable subscriber in the United States. It is difficult to determine
whether cases like this are examples of malware.
Even more worrisome are the 5,455 instances where we could not identify the issuer,
and the 1,518 where the issuer field is null or blank. Whoever set up the TLS proxy in these
cases did not want to be identified.

41

Part III

Surveys
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Chapter 6
Methodology of First Survey

The diversity of TLS proxy behavior and prevalence found in our measurement study
prompted us to conduct a survey on user attitudes toward TLS proxies in the general public.
The security community at large has generally considered TLS proxies to be malicious, yet
our measurements suggested that many organizations and individuals were utilizing them for
protective measures. Reconciling these two attitudes required additional insight from users
themselves. We were especially curious whether users were aware of TLS proxies, and how
they felt about TLS proxy use in different institutions and circumstances.
To better understand users’ perspectives on these issues, we surveyed 1,976 people
across two surveys regarding their opinions of TLS proxies and their use in inspecting
encrypted traffic. Both surveys were conducted using the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
crowdsourcing service. Participants were given $1 USD as compensation for completing each
survey, and both surveys were approved by our Institutional Review Board.
In February 2014, we conducted the first online survey using the Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) crowdsourcing service. We gathered responses on Wednesday, February
12, 2014 between 7:50 AM and 5:22 PM (PST). Each participant could take the survey
once and received $1 USD as compensation upon completing the survey. In total 1,262
people completed the online survey. The survey was approved by our Institutional Review
Board and is contained in Appendix A.1. The data from both surveys is accessible at
tlsresearch.byu.edu.
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6.1

Instructing Participants

Before conducting this survey, we felt it was unlikely that most people would be aware of
TLS proxies (an assumption that was upheld by our results). This presented a dilemma:
either we would need to only survey individuals who were already aware of TLS proxies or we
would need to instruct participants about TLS proxies. Both of these options have significant
drawbacks. Limiting the survey to individuals with pre-existing knowledge regarding TLS
proxies would likely limit us to participants with highly technical backgrounds, thus failing
to gather information about broader opinions related to the inspection of encrypted traffic.
On the other hand, instructing participants on TLS proxies has the risk of unintentionally
biasing them one way or another, and requires them to answer questions about a subject
they potentially just learned about.
Because our research goal was to survey broad opinions regarding the inspection of
encrypted traffic, we preferred not to limit our population to the small fraction of users
who are already aware of this issue. Instead, we chose to accept the limitations related to
instructing participants about TLS proxies and survey as many participants as possible. For
our goals, this was preferable to ignoring the opinions of a large portion of users.
To address the risks related to instructing participants on an issue and then surveying
them, we spent considerable effort and time crafting our description of TLS proxies. Our
goals were to (1) give a simple and concise overview of how TLS proxies are used to inspect
encrypted traffic, and (2) present participants with a fair and unbiased description of how
the inspection of encrypted traffic could be used for both benevolent and malicious purposes.
In preparation for writing the description of TLS proxies, we examined the literature
and observed that existing descriptions of TLS proxies were not neutral in tone and would
unduly bias participants. We talked with businesses that sell proxies (i.e., Blue Coat,
Symantec) and read opinions from privacy advocates to better understand both sides’
opinions. Based on the information in these sources, we composed a draft of our description
of TLS proxies, focusing on using language that was informative and neutral in tone, allowing
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participants to form their own opinions. Our team of researchers, which included members
who are fundamentally opposed to TLS proxies and members who accept their benevolent
uses, iterated on this description until all members were satisfied with its wording.
We then tested this description using a convenience sample of six individuals from
our university who were not a part of our research group to ensure it was balanced and
understandable. Based on feedback from the convenience sample, we made minor edits to
the description.
Finally, we tested this revised description using MTurk to ensure that participants
felt that the description was sufficiently understandable. Of the 80 participants in this pilot
survey, nearly all participants (73; 91%) indicated that the description of TLS proxies helped
them understand what TLS proxies are and how they are used (2 participants indicated
the description was not helpful (2; 3%), with the remainder being undecided (5; 6%)). We
also examined participant responses to free response questions and found that, as reported,
most participants’ answers reflected an accurate understanding of TLS proxies. As such, we
included this version of the description in both surveys, as shown in Figure 6.1.

6.2

Survey Contents

The survey begins by gathering demographic information. It then instructs participants
about TLS proxies and their use in the inspection of encrypted traffic. Next, participants
are asked to share their opinions regarding the use of TLS proxies and the inspection of
encrypted traffic. These questions survey participant opinions as to whether TLS proxies are
a breach of their privacy and whether there are acceptable uses for TLS proxies. Participants
are also asked their reasoning for why TLS proxies should or should not be allowed. Also,
participants are asked which parties they are concerned about using TLS proxies and what,
if any, measures should be used to regulate their use.
The survey then asks participants about how they would personally react to having
a TLS proxy on a network they use to connect to the Internet. This section includes two
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When you connect to the Internet you do so through some organization’s network. For
example, at home you connect to your Internet service provider’s (ISP) network, while at
work you connect to your employer’s network. To protect your information from others
on the network you can create secure connections to the websites you use (HTTPS).
This is done automatically for you when you log into a website. The secure connection
encrypts your Internet traffic so that no one else can view or modify your communication
with the website (see Figure A).

Figure A
The network you use to connect to the Internet can also be set up to use a system called
a TLS proxy. TLS proxies sit in the middle of your secure connection to the websites
you view (see Figure B). At the TLS proxy your Internet traffic is decrypted and the
web proxy can view and modify it. Afterwards, the TLS proxy will then re-encrypt your
traffic and forward it along. This is done silently and without the knowledge of you or
the website you connect to.

Figure B
TLS proxies can be set up by the organization that controls your Internet (for example,
your ISP, school, or employer) and also by malicious attackers. TLS proxies have many
different uses:

Protective
Malicious
Blocking malware and viruses Stealing passwords
Protecting company secrets
Identity theft
Blocking harmful websites
Tracking government dissidents
Catching malicious individuals Spying (for example the NSA)
Censorship

Figure 6.1: TLS Proxy Description
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open-ended questions, the first asking them what concerns they might have and the second
asking them how it would affect their opinion of the organization running the TLS proxy.
Finally, participants are given a chance to express any remaining comments they might have.1

6.3

Survey Development

Before running our survey, we conducted a pilot survey using MTurk to ensure that we would
get meaningful and thoughtful results. This pilot survey was IRB approved and included 80
participants. Based on our analysis of participants’ answers in this pilot survey, it was clear
that participants generally understood the description of TLS proxies presented to them, and
so we proceeded to launch the full survey. Responses from the pilot survey are not included
in our results.

6.4

Qualitative Data Analysis

To better understand participants’ opinions regarding TLS proxies and to avoid biasing their
responses, we included several open-ended questions in the survey. For each question, we
created a codebook to categorize participant responses. One researcher reviewed all the
participant responses and created the initial codebooks. The codebooks were then modified
through discussion with the coders.
After coding was completed, all of the coders met together to discuss the data. As
part of this discussion they were encouraged to identify themes that they had seen in the data.
Particular attention was paid to the themes that they felt the codebook did not adequately
cover. Coders also shared responses that they felt best represented the various viewpoints
expressed by participants.
In total, there were seven coders that analyzed the data. We validated the consistency
of the coders using Fleiss’ Kappa [26]. Coders’ agreement ranged from “substantial agreement”
1
As shown in the Appendix, questions are grouped onto several pages. After questions on one page are
answered and the user continues with the survey, they are unable to return and modify their answers.
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to “almost perfect agreement” (with kappa values ranging from .687 to 1, mean of .865 and
median of .833).

6.5

Amazon Mechanical Turk

We used Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to recruit survey participants. MTurk has
become an increasingly popular method for gathering participant data for usability studies
and user surveys. Buhrmester et al. found that MTurk participants are significantly more
diverse than typical American College samples and that data obtained from MTurk studies is
at least as reliable as those obtained via more traditional methods [12]. Kittur et al. used
MTurk participants to classify Wikipedia entries and found that that they could produce
results equivalent to expert raters [42]. While MTurk has known limitations, it is still a
mostly reliable platform for rapidly obtaining results related to user sentiment [40, 61].

6.6

Quality Control

To ensure participants provided valid data, we accepted only participants that had previously
completed 1,000 tasks on MTurk with an overall task approval rate of 95% or higher. Second,
the seven coders examined participants’ responses to open-ended questions in order to ensure
that participants had both understood the description of TLS proxies and remained on topic.
We validated the consistency of the coders’ choice to exclude participants’ responses using
Fleiss’ Kappa [26] and found that coders were in perfect agreement (kappa value of 1). During
the coding process, a participant’s responses were discarded if their answers were clearly spam
(i.e., copying the text of a Wikipedia page), or they did not understand the questions being
asked (i.e., their answers discussed HTTP proxies). In total, we excluded 153 participants’
responses (12.1%) as spam and 60 participants (4.8%) as misunderstandings. The remaining
1,049 participants’ responses constitute the results of our first survey.
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6.7

Demographics

The demographics for the participants are shown in Table 6.1. Most participants were from
the United States (87%), with the rest primarily from India (11.5%). Although results from a
previous paper suggested that MTurk participants from India are less concerned with privacy
[38], the results from our first survey found that they were more likely to report privacy
concerns than their counterparts from the United States of America (χ2 [2, N = 1049] =
12.35, p < 0.01).
Participants were skewed towards males (61%), and ages were centered around 25–32
(46%). Most participants were single (60%) and had no children (62%). Nearly all participants
had completed high school, with the majority having completed some level of higher education
(57%).
Participants were asked to self-report their level of knowledge of Internet security,
with most rating somewhere between somewhat knowledgeable and mildly knowledgeable
(78%).
After reading the description of TLS proxies, participants were asked whether they
had prior knowledge of TLS proxies. Most participants reported having little to no awareness
of TLS proxies before the survey: unaware (66.5%), unsure (8.1%), aware (25.4%). We
speculate that due to the effects of illusory superiority, the number of participants that were
unaware of TLS proxies before the survey was even higher than reported [28, 32]. Additionally,
participants may have conflated knowledge of traditional web proxies with knowledge of TLS
proxies.

6.8

Limitations

In our survey, participant demographics were slightly skewed towards a younger male population and nearly all participants were from the US and India. Additional work could be
done to replicate our results with different populations. Cross-cultural, international surveys
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Survey 1
(N=1,049)

Survey 2
(N=927)

86.9%
11.5%
0.3%

94.3%
5.7%
N/A

61.1%
38.6%
0.3%

60.6%
38.9%
0.4%

18.7%
47.0%
19.6%
8.6%
5.8%
0.3%

17.8%
45.8%
21.8%
7.9%
6.3%
0.4%

59.5%
35.5%
4.7%
0.6%

60.9%
35.6%
2.7%
0.8%

36.6%
62.3%
0.9%

32.5%
67.2%
0.3%

1.0%
12.4%
28.9%
49.9%
7.6%
0.2%

0.6%
11.0%
29.3%
50.5%
8.4%
0.1%

4.6%
35.7%
42.4%
14.4%
2.4%
0.2%

2.6%
32.4%
47.8%
15.2%
1.8%
0.2%

Country
United States
India
Other
Gender
Male
Female
Prefer not to answer
Age
18–24 years old
25–34 years old
35–44 years old
45–54 years old
55+ years old
Prefer not to answer
Relationship
Single
Married
Other
Prefer not to answer
Children
Yes
No
Prefer not to answer
Education
No diploma
High school
Some college or university credit
College or university degree
Post-Secondary Education
Prefer Not To Answer
Knowledge
No Knowledge
Somewhat Knowledgeable
Mildly Knowledgeable
Highly Knowledgeable
Expert
Prefer Not To Answer

Table 6.1: Participant Demographics
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would be especially interesting, but these should be conducted by researchers that can engage
participants in their native language and have an understanding of participants’ cultural
perceptions.
As shown in prior work, participants’ reported security preferences and desires do not
always align with their actual behaviors [67]. Often users will report being more privacy
minded than they are in practice. Interestingly, in our survey participants indicated a high
level of acceptance for TLS proxies, which could suggest that real-world acceptance of TLS
proxies is even higher than we measured. On the other hand, many participants reported
wanting to have their consent obtained, or at least be notified of, the inspection of encrypted
traffic; in practice, it is possible that fewer participants would actually be interested in being
notified.
Finally, while we spent considerable effort to craft a fair and unbiased description of
TLS proxies and the inspection of encrypted traffic, there is still the possibility that it had
a significant effect on some participants’ responses. For example, in the real world, users
often learn about security issues from the news, which is often sensational and biased. In
contrast, our description strove for neutrality, and as such may have led to users taking a
more rational view of the inspection of encrypted traffic than would occur in the wild. While
we chose to accept these limitations in order to obtain opinions from as many participants as
possible, an open avenue for future research is to find a way to gather equally widespread
opinions in a way that has fewer limitations.
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Chapter 7
Results from First Survey

In this chapter we discuss the results of our survey in three areas: acceptable uses for
TLS proxies, general concerns toward their use, and the reaction participants would have if
they discovered a network they use employed a TLS proxy.

7.1

Acceptable Uses of TLS Proxies

Figure 7.1 shows participant attitudes toward proxies. A somewhat surprising result is that
participants largely (752; 71.7%) felt that there were acceptable uses for TLS proxies. This
feeling prevailed even though nearly half of the participants (522; 49.8%) indicated that
TLS proxies are an invasion of privacy, and only one-eighth of participants (185; 17.6%) felt
they presented no invasion of privacy. There is a strong correlation between thinking TLS
proxies were an invasion of privacy and believing that there were not acceptable uses for
them (χ2 [4, N = 1049] = 141.50, p < 0.001). Nevertheless, over a quarter of participants (297;
28.0%) felt that TLS proxies were an invasion of privacy, but still had acceptable uses.
To better understand what uses might be acceptable, we asked participants who felt
there were acceptable uses to enumerate those uses in an open-ended question. The results
from our coded responses are shown in the top part of Table 7.1. The acceptable uses are
largely concentrated on three use cases:
1. Protecting organizations (493; 65.6%). Many participants felt that organizations
(e.g., businesses, government agencies, schools, libraries) had a right to protect their own
intellectual property and security. This included protecting the company from viruses
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Opinion

Participants
Acceptable Uses

Protect organizations
Protect individuals
Law enforcement and surveillance
Censor content
Never censor content
Acceptable at work, not at home

51.4%
34.8%
8.9%
7.1%
3.1%
2.9%

(n=539)
(n=365)
(n=93)
(n=75)
(n=32)
(n=30)

Concerns
Hackers and spying
Privacy and identity theft
Done without knowledge or consent

60.5% (n=635)
55.4% (n=581)
13.2% (n=138)
Reactions

Negative
Positive
Depends
Suspicious
Discontinue use
Change behavior (besides discontinue)

60.8%
5.0%
34.2%
25.8%
17.2%
6.2%

Table 7.1: Qualitative Response Categorization (N=1,049)
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(n=638)
(n=52)
(n=359)
(n=271)
(n=180)
(n=65)

TLS Proxies Are an Invasion of Privacy
There Are Acceptable Uses of TLS Proxies
Concerned TLS Proxies Could Be Used by Hackers
Concerned TLS Proxies Could Be Used by Governments
Browsers Should Notify Users of TLS Proxies
There Should Be Legislation Addressing TLS Proxies
0%
Strongly Agree

Agree

10%

20%

30%

Neither Agree nor Disagree

40%

50%

Disagree

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Strongly Disagree

Figure 7.1: Participant Attitudes Toward TLS Proxies (N=1,049)
and hackers, filtering inappropriate or potentially malicious websites, and preventing
the leak of sensitive information. Participants mentioned that since these organizations
provide the Internet for their employees or constituents they had a right to use TLS
proxies on their own networks.
2. Protecting individuals (339; 45.1%). Participants saw value in businesses using
TLS proxies to protect their customers. This protection came in one of two forms:
• Direct. Antivirus applications and firewalls could use TLS proxies to filter
malware and viruses. Similarly, ISPs could use TLS proxies to detect and prevent
phishing attackers and block other inappropriate or malicious websites.
• Indirect. Participants recognized that they have a significant amount of private
information stored externally on the web (e.g., at Amazon or Google). In order to
protect this data, participants hoped that the companies storing their private data
would employ TLS proxies internally to ensure the safety of the customer’s data.
3. Law enforcement and surveillance (65; 8.6%). Nearly a tenth of participants
expressed that law enforcement agencies should also be allowed to use TLS proxies.
This includes use by local or federal agencies to track criminal or terrorist activity.
Several participants also expressed that while this was a legitimate use it should only
be done with a valid warrant or if there was an imminent threat to national security.
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7.2

Concerns

Even though many participants in the first survey saw acceptable uses for TLS proxies, they
were not without concerns or reservations. Based on our coding, we grouped these concerns
into the categories shown in the middle part of Table 7.1. Three-quarters of the participants
(795; 75.8%) mentioned they worried about hackers and nearly as many were concerned about
the possibility for governmental spying (743; 70.9%). There was also a strong correlation
between the concern that hackers could use TLS proxies and that the government could use
them (χ2 [4, N = 1049] = 194.57, p < 0.001).
The most visceral concerns were related to the breach of privacy. One of the open
response questions asked participants to list what possible concerns they had regarding the
use of TLS proxies. Over half of participants (581; 55.4%) mentioned they were concerned
with a loss of privacy and personal information. Nearly a tenth of participants (104; 9.91%)
mentioned having their identity stolen, and even more participants had answers that addressed
the issue of identity theft generally.
A non-negligible number of the participants freely shared that either they, a family
member, or other acquaintance had been the victim of account compromise. Similar to the
finding of Shay et al. [58] this was a traumatic experience and it left participants especially
concerned that TLS proxies could be used to perpetrate identity theft. R208 shared,
“A major concern that I would have would be the security of my personal and
financial information. I have many friends who have been victims of identity theft
and fraud, and would hate to have to go through what they did.”
Participants were also concerned that TLS proxies could be used without their
knowledge. One-eighth of participants (138; 13.2%) mentioned in the open response question
that they were concerned with privacy. Furthermore, when directly asked about notification,
an overwhelming majority of participants (951; 90.7%) asserted they wanted to be notified by
their browsers of the presence of TLS proxies. Similarly, participants largely (942; 89.8%) felt
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that there should be legislation concerning TLS proxies. Most (782; 74.5%) wanted legislation
to require notification, and nearly as many (701; 66.8%) wanted legislation to require consent.

7.3

Reactions

Participants in the first survey had varied responses on how they would react to learning
that they currently use a network that employs TLS proxies. Based on our coding, we
grouped these concerns into the categories shown in the bottom part of Table 7.1. Over half
of participants (638; 60.8%) mentioned that it would negatively affect their opinion of the
owner of that network. For example, R77 stated,
“I would be angry and would feel that organization violated my trust. I would
wonder what information that organization had been collecting on me and what they
planned to do with it. If it was my employer, I also would think that organization
did not trust me and would consider working somewhere else.”
Still, a third of participants (359; 34.2%) said that their reaction would depend on
who the owner of the network was and how they were using the proxy. For example, if the
owner of the network was their employer they would not have a negative reaction, but if it
was their ISP or government they would be very unhappy. Participants also mentioned that
their approval would rest on whether or not any personal information was collected and/or
sold and whether their consent had first been obtained. R960 explained,
“It would be on a case by case basis. I can see some instances where it would be
understandable, but if it was going on without my consent, I would be wary of
dealing with them in the future.”
Participants also mentioned ways in which their behavior would change if they learned
a network was employing a TLS proxy. A quarter of participants (271; 25.8%) said that it
would make them suspicious of the owner of that network. A quarter of participants (245;
23.4%) also mentioned that they would change their behavior on that network. For some
56

participants (180; 17.2%) this included discontinuing use of the network and its services,
while others (65; 6.2%) mentioned they would change the content they looked at on the
Internet or be more careful about entering personal information, including but not limited
to e-commerce transactions. At the extreme, some participants mentioned they would quit
their job if they found that their employer’s network used a TLS proxy. For example, R127
expressed,
“If my employers were secretly spying on my private data, I would sue them if
legally possible, and quit the job regardless.”

7.4

Personas

As our research group discussed the answers to open response questions in the first survey,
it became clear that the participants could generally be classified into one of four personas:
pragmatic, privacy fundamentalist, jaded, and unconcerned. After recognizing this, two members of the research group re-evaluated 90 participant responses and categorized participants
into one of these four personas. The Fleiss’ Kappa for this classification was 1 (i.e., perfect
agreement). One researcher then classified the rest of the responses. The breakdown of
participants into these categories is given in Table 7.2.1
Even though three of these personas have similar names to personas formulated by
Westin [66], our categories are in no way based on the research of Westin. Instead, our
methodology for creating personas more closely relates to that of Woodruff et al. [67], i.e.,
analyzing how participants indicate they would act in various privacy-related situations in
order to determine their persona. Moreover, we do not intend these personas to be a definitive
list of privacy personas, but rather view them as a helpful way to identify trends within our
data.
1

There were ten participants whose answers were vague enough that we did not feel comfortable classifying
them as any of the personas.
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Persona

Number

Percent

802
178
48
11
10

76.5%
17.0%
4.6%
1.0%
1.0%

Pragmatic majority
Privacy fundamentalist
Jaded
Unconcerned
Unclassified

Table 7.2: Participant Persona Categorization (N=1,049)
Pragmatic Majority, N=802
The pragmatic majority weighed consumer benefits and protections of public safety against
costs of intrusive practices, believed that organizations should earn the public’s trust, and
wanted to have the opportunity to opt-out of intrusive practices. This group was strongly
correlated with being more likely to feel that there were acceptable uses for TLS proxies
(χ2 [4, N = 1028] = 230.48, p < 0.001). R93 stated,
“I think it is perfectly acceptable for organizations (companies, schools, libraries,
etc.) to use TLS proxies because it protects their computers. It keeps hackers from
getting to sensitive or confidential information of the organization. In addition,
it blocks harmful viruses that can cause a lot of damage and expense in repair.
It can also keep individuals from accessing websites (employees from playing
online games or minors from accessing pornography). It is perfectly reasonable for
companies to employee[sic] this device for these purposes when an individual is
using their computer. We should not expect privacy when we are using someone
else’s computer.”
Though the pragmatic majority all weighed consumer benefits versus intrusive practices,
they were not uniform in their conclusions about where and how TLS proxies should be used.
Some recognized the right of employers to use them, while others believed they should only
be allowed in narrow cases such as with a warrant.

58

Privacy Fundamentalist, N=178
The privacy fundamentalist was generally distrustful of organizations that ask for personal
information, in favor of legislation enhancing privacy, and chose privacy controls over consumer
benefits when a trade-off existed between the two. These participants were strongly correlated
with being more likely to feel TLS proxies were an invasion of privacy (χ2 [4, N = 1028] =
114.81, p < 0.001). These participants were also more likely to support legislation of TLS
proxies (χ2 [2, N = 1028] = 14.40, p < 0.001).
The defining feature of the privacy fundamentalist was that they viewed privacy as so
important that it could not be traded for any benefit, no matter how great. As emphatically
stated by R1119, “I believe privacy is sacrosanct and one could argue that it’s a Constitutional
right.”
They were also likely to relate the use of TLS proxies to more traditional methods of
surveillance such as wiretapping and intercepting mail.

Jaded, N=48
Jaded individuals were aware that violations of privacy happen regularly, believed that
governments conduct surveillance on the general public, and had lost hope that they can
have privacy online. These participants felt that “the system” was rigged to remove any real
chance of them having privacy. For example, R713 expressed,
“I know that it is my choice to use the internet; however, since I live in a remote
area with no transportation to the nearest city (30 miles away) I am ‘stuck’
working and banking and doing business on the internet. I feel it is unfair to be
made to choose between being ‘safe’ and having privacy freedom. I am especially
disgusted by our government’s spying behaviors and the rhetoric about it being
necessary for national defense.”
Likewise, when asked about concerns regarding the use of TLS proxies, R831 shared,
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“None. The government (via the NSA) is already reading everything we do and
share online. So no surprises there.”
Other jaded participants felt they had no choice in the matter because in the United States
Internet service providers often have a monopoly.

Unconcerned, N=11
Unconcerned participants were generally trustful of organizations that ask for personal
information, willing to sacrifice personal privacy to obtain consumer benefits, and not in favor
of legislation to protect or enhance privacy. In our survey, we found very few unconcerned
participants (1%). It is possible that the recent news regarding widespread government
surveillance caused participants to be more privacy aware and sensitive. In addition, our
use of qualitative data to classify participants allowed us to recognize that participants were
part of the pragmatic majority even when their Likert responses might seem to indicate
otherwise.
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Chapter 8
Methodology of Second Survey

Our first survey revealed that participants’ opinions related to TLS proxies were
closely tied to the situation in which TLS proxies were being used. To better clarify user
feelings in this area, we formulated a second survey in which we ask participants about a
series of specific scenarios where inspection of encrypted traffic could be used. This second
survey serves to give quantitative backing to the qualitative data gathered in the first survey.
We collected data for our second survey on Tuesday, February 24, 2015 between 11:02
AM and 1:06 PM (PST). Each participant could take the survey once and received $1 USD
as compensation upon completing the survey. The survey begins exactly as the first survey
by gathering demographic information and then instructing participants about TLS proxies
and their uses, both benevolent and malicious. Participants are then asked their opinions
regarding the use of TLS proxies in various circumstances. In total 1,005 people completed
the online survey. The survey was also approved by our Institutional Review Board and is
contained in Appendix A.2.

8.1

Survey Description

The first portion of the second survey includes the same description of TLS proxies as the
first one. It then asks several questions repeated from the first survey: whether TLS proxies
are an invasion of privacy and whether there are acceptable uses for TLS proxies.
The main portion of this survey asks participants their opinion regarding different
situations where TLS proxies may be used to inspect encrypted traffic, such as by an employer,
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Study 1 – Invasion of Privacy
Study 2 – Invasion of Privacy
Study 1 – Acceptable Uses
Study 2 – Acceptable Uses
0%
Strongly Agree

10%
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20%
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60%
Disagree

70%

80%

90%

100%

Strongly Disagree

Figure 8.1: Participant Attitudes Toward TLS Proxies (Survey 1 – N=1,049, Survey 2 –
N=927)
at a school, or a café with free WiFi. The full list of scenarios is given in Figure 9.1. For
each situation, participants are asked whether the organization should be allowed to run a
TLS proxy, with responses taken from (1) No, (2) Only if I consent, (3) Only if I am notified
(consent not required), (4) Yes (neither notification nor consent required), or (5) Unsure.
To choose the situations, we used responses from open-ended questions in the first survey,
along with suggestions from our research team to fill out the list. Finally, we had a single
open-ended question where participants could share any opinions they still had remaining at
the end of the survey.
We note that this survey had the same limitations as our first survey.

8.2

Quality Control

To ensure participants provided valid data, we accepted only participants that had previously
completed 1,000 tasks on MTurk with an overall task approval rate of 95% or higher. Second,
we limited participants to the United States and India. This was done because with the first
survey coders struggled to understand answers to free response questions from outside the
United States and India.1 Third, we looked at the single open-ended question to determine if
participants had entered spam (e.g., copied an answer from Wikipedia). Finally, we used two
validation questions in the second survey because there were not enough open responses to
always distinguish spam entries.
1

Moreover, these represent a small enough portion of participants that their responses had no significant
effect on the data.
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Survey 1
(N=1,049)

Survey 2
(N=927)

4.1%
21.3%
8.1%
48.1%
18.4%

8.4%
27.9%
13.2%
34.3%
16.2%

Prior Knowledge of TLS Proxies
Strongly Agree
Agree
Neither Agree nor Disagree
Disagree
Strongly Disagree

Table 8.1: Participants’ Knowledge of TLS Proxies
In total, we excluded 78 participant’s responses (7.8%). The remaining 927 participant’s responses constitute the results of our second survey.

8.3

Demographics

The demographics for the participants were summarized earlier in Table 6.1. There were no
significant differences in the demographics of the first and second surveys.

63

Chapter 9
Results from Second Survey

In this chapter we discuss results from our second survey. First we compare results
from the three questions that were the same between both surveys. We then discuss the
quantitative data regarding participants’ opinions regarding different deployment scenarios
for TLS proxies.

9.1

Comparison

In both surveys, after reading the description of TLS proxies, participants were asked
whether they had prior knowledge of TLS proxies. These are shown in Table 8.1. In
the first survey, most participants reported having little to no awareness of TLS proxies
before the survey: aware (25.4%), unsure (8.1%), unaware (66.5%). In the second survey,
more participants reported being aware of proxies beforehand (the difference is statistically
significant, χ2 [4, N = 1976] = 60.003, p < 0.001), though over half still reported having little
to no awareness of TLS proxies before the survey: unaware (50.5%), unsure (13.2%), aware
(36.3%). We note that 172 of our respondents in our second survey also took part in our
original survey, which probably accounts for this difference. These repeat respondents were
not explicitly solicited. It should also be noted that the primary purpose of this secondary
survey was to gather opinions on different deployment scenarios for TLS proxies. The
questions posed to gather this information were unique to the second survey. It is our belief
that only two questions on the second survey could have their responses influenced by the
first survey: 1) asking about prior knowledge of TLS proxies and 2) asking how well the TLS
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Your Employer When You Use a Company Computer
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Public Library
University
Software You Installed to Protect Your Computer
Free WiFi -- Airport, Hotel, Cafe, Etc.
Your Employer When You Use Your Own Device
Paid WiFi
Your ISP
Your Government Monitoring Your Internet Traffic
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Figure 9.1: Participant Responses on Scenarios—Should the Organization Be Allowed To
Run a TLS Proxy? (N=927)
proxy description assisted in helping users understand them. All other questions posed were
merely demographic, spam countermeasures, or solicitations of opinions.
We also compared responses relating to whether participants in both surveys felt
that TLS proxies were an invasion of privacy, and whether TLS proxies had acceptable uses
(see Figure 8.1). Participants in the second survey were less likely to view TLS proxies
as an invasion of privacy (first survey – 50%, second survey – 35%), with the difference
being statistically significant (χ2 [4, N = 1976] = 54.228, p < 0.001). Similarly, participants
in the second survey were also more likely to feel that there were acceptable uses for TLS
proxies (first survey – 72%, second survey – 85%), with this difference also being statistically
significant (χ2 [4, N = 1976] = 140.654, p < 0.001).
It is important to note that in both surveys, after participants answered each group
of questions (see Appendix) participants were unable to return to earlier groups of questions
and alter their answers. As such, the above reported differences are not due to differences in
the survey, as up to this point the surveys were identical.

9.2

Scenarios

We asked participants regarding their opinions towards the inspection of encrypted traffic in
specific scenarios. For each scenario, participants indicate whether they were comfortable with
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the traffic being intercepted (“Yes”), whether they wanted to be notified (“Notified”), whether
they wanted their consent to be obtained (“Consent”), or whether they were uncomfortable
with it. The results for these questions are summarized in Figure 9.1.
Participants in our second survey are generally willing to accept the use of TLS
proxies in most situations, with acceptance ranging from 65% to 90% of participants, when
summing together those who accept it, those who desire notification, and those who desire
both notification and consent. For both employers (when you use your own computer) and
elementary schools, the support for using TLS proxies without notification or consent from
users is surprisingly strong (455; 49.1% and 434; 46.8%). This may be due to a belief in
employer rights in the first case and a desire to protect children in the second case. In both
cases there is still strong support for either notification or consent (419; 45.2% and 377;
40.7%).
The strongest objections to any kind of TLS proxy are for government monitoring
(437; 47.1%), using your own device at work (297; 32.0%), or using your own ISP (271; 29.2%).
Note these latter two map to situations where the user has paid for the device or for network
access. Users have stronger objections to TLS proxies when they pay for network access
through a home ISP than when they pay for WiFi when they are away from home.
When examining the differences among opinions for notification versus consent, we
see that the preference for consent is higher for personal firewalls (software you installed to
protect your computer), your ISP, free WiFi, paid WiFi, and using your own device at work.
The preference is higher for notification for a public library, university, elementary school,
and using a company computer at work. This seems to be a clear split that favors consent in
cases where the user feels in control versus notification when an organization is in control.
The strongest support for consent is with a personal firewall (385; 41.5%), your ISP (375;
40.5%), and paid WiFi (358; 38.6%).
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Chapter 10
Survey Open Responses

In this chapter we discuss interesting themes we saw as we analyzed participants’
responses to the open-ended questions.

10.1

Informed Participants

Most of the participants showed a high level of engagement in the survey. At the end of
the survey when asked if they had any additional comments, a large number of participants
mentioned that they were thankful that we had informed them of this information. Some
even asked where they could get more information on the topic of TLS proxies. Additionally,
we were impressed with the in-depth analysis of trade-offs that many users shared, which
often went far beyond the scope of any information provided to them in the survey.
Participants clearly understood that there were trade-offs involved with the use of
TLS proxies and the inspection of encrypted traffic, weighing the benevolent uses for schools
or workplaces and the danger of misuse by insiders or by hackers. As they struggled with this
trade-off, participant responses indicated confusion, doubt, worry, equivocation, and reasoned
conclusions. Confusion regarding how to resolve the conflict was evident when participants
labeled it a “grey area.” R988 considered both good and bad uses and worried, “How are
you supposed to know which is happening?”
Some participants weighed the trade-offs and resolved the dilemma by deciding that
proxies should only be used by consent. For example, R827 expressed:
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“I believe that TLS proxies are an invasion of privacy, as is anything that monitors
my internet usage without my permission. However if you are using someone
else’s (like a company’s) network, they have every right to make the rules of
use... This is one of those doubled-edged swords – it can be used for your good
and security and it can be used to harm and spy on you. Because of the distinct
possibility of lost privacy, this type of proxy should [not be] used, except by your
agreement, not by anyone else.”
Others wanted companies or schools to be able to use TLS proxies for security purposes,
but also wanted to prevent them from being used for government surveillance or by hackers.
Still others felt TLS proxies should only be used by the government to catch terrorists or
criminals.
Similarly, of the participants who were against the use of TLS proxies, the reasons for
opposing TLS proxies were not amorphous, but concrete and rational. For example, R666
stated:
“I think TLS proxies don’t sound very safe because it sounds like an invasion of
privacy. I don’t think organizations should be able to decrypt your internet traffic
and modify it and re-encrypt it. Perhaps they are just trying to protect against
viruses and the like but it doesn’t sound safe for the person using the internet.
What if this technology was misused? Someone could get [h]old of your financial
information for example. It sounds to[o] risky. I wouldn’t want to buy something
online and risk someone having access to my credit card number.”

10.2

Notification and Consent

Numerous participants expressed a desire for notification and consent when TLS proxies were
being used on a network. A typical response as given by R413 was,
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“Well for some things it would be understandable, I’d just like to be informed so
I know the risk I’m taking.”
R313 expressed,
“If I encrypt something no one has the right to unencrypt it unless I give them
the right to - simple as that.”
Participants expressed extreme distrust for those who would use TLS proxies without
informing users, going so far as to say they “would hate them,” “would wonder what they are
looking for,” and “would assume they were up to no good.”
Others stated they would change their behavior if notified about a proxy, such as
avoiding commercial transactions, using a VPN to circumvent a proxy, or self-censorship of
their Google searches and other online communication.

10.3

Jaded Participants

We were surprised to find that 4.5% of participants were “jaded” towards the current state of
privacy online. They felt that currently it is largely impossible to have any expectation of
privacy or security. Many felt that the government was already spying on the population at
large, and that even without TLS proxies the government could find a way to gain access to
their private information. Others felt that even if they discovered that their traffic was being
intercepted, they would have no recourse as their access to the Internet is controlled by a
monopoly.
We find this group concerning, as this is not a group of individuals unconcerned with
security and privacy. Rather they are a group that still cares about privacy, but has lost
all hope that they can actually achieve digital privacy. This is a troubling trend, as such
individuals are unlikely to adopt solutions that could actually benefit them. As such, work
needs to be done to determine how this type of user’s trust can be regained.
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10.4

Changing Opinions

Between our two surveys, we noticed differences in the way participants viewed TLS proxies.
This demonstrates that users’ perceptions towards security and privacy are not static. As
such, it is important that work such as this be done on a regular basis, helping the security
community stay abreast of current opinions and attitudes.
One interesting difference is that in the second survey fewer participants viewed
inspection of encrypted traffic as an invasion of privacy, and more participants felt that there
were acceptable uses for this practice. One possible explanation for this difference is that news
stories have been discussing how encryption and other privacy preserving technologies could
be used by terrorist organizations. Still, additional research is needed to better understand
this shift in attitudes towards security and privacy.
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Part IV

Related Work and Conclusion
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Chapter 11
Related Work

11.1

TLS MITM Mitigation

A large body of work seeks to detect and prevent TLS proxies, generally regarding them as
MITM attacks. Clark and van Oorschot [15] provide an extensive survey of this area and
provide one of the few research papers that acknowledges the existence of benevolent TLS
proxies. Below we survey the various mitigation approaches in the field.
Multi-path probing allows clients to determine whether the certificate they have been
given for a server is different from those seen by most other clients. Representative systems
include Perspectives [65], Convergence [46], and DoubleCheck [4]. Crossbear [31] goes a step
further to use traceroute to localize the origin of the attack. Other systems use existing
Certificate Authorities or centralized notaries to vouch for the authenticity of a certificate
[5, 6, 22]. Each of these systems may suffer from false alarms due to benign changes to
certificates and the presence of multiple valid certificates for a given site [7].
There are several proposals to leverage the shared password between the client and
server to prevent a MITM attack. Direct Validation of Certificates (DVCert) [16] permits
the server to attest to the authenticity of all the certificates used in a session with the web
application, including certificates from other domains. TLS Session-Aware User Authentication [53] thwarts TLS MITM attacks through user authentication tokens based on client
credentials and TLS session information. The proposed TLS-SRP protocol [60] would extend
the TLS handshake to support mutual authentication based on a shared password.
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Several proposals leverage DNS to prevent MITM attacks. ConfiDNS [55] utilizes
the temporal and spatial redundancy of the existing DNS system to assess agreement for
IP resolution. The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) [57] protocol
enables administrators to bind hostnames to their certificates. This permits public keys to
be transmitted via DNSSEC without involving a CA.
Certificate pinning [23] is a Google proposal for the web server to limit all future
HTTPS connections to a limited set of server certificates. Pinning is a trust-on-first-use
technology. The Google Chrome browser comes pre-configured with some Google certificates
already pinned in advance so the user does not have the TOFU issue with those sites.
Chrome also trusts any locally installed trusted roots, so benevolent proxies and malware can
circumvent the pinning process. Trust Assertions for Certificate Keys (TACK) [47] is a TLS
extension for the server to pin a signing key that must sign all other keys in the domain.
Another approach is to use an audit log of valid certificates issued by Certificate
Authorities. Representative work in this area is Certificate Transparency (CT) [43, 56] and
the EFF sovereign keys (SK) project [21]. The Accountable Key Infrastructure (AKI) [41] is
a proposal for new infrastructure to validate public keys and reduce the reliance on CAs. This
system also includes public log servers that support public validation of certificate integrity.
A different approach acknowledges that there is an industry need for TLS inspection to
detect malware or protect intellectual property. Several proposals to the IETF from industry
introduce mechanisms that would make proxies visible to the other participants in a chain of
TLS connections and could include user notification and consent [45, 50]. Another proposal
[52] introduces an extension to TLS that enables a client to share decryption keys with a
TLS proxy. A potential drawback is that the key-sharing mechanism represents a new attack
surface that hackers could attempt to exploit to acquire the decryption keys for a TLS session.

73

11.2

Measurements

The most closely related work in this field is a recent paper, published during our own work,
by Huang et al., which independently develops a measurement tool that is very similar to
ours and conducts a measurement study of TLS proxies that intercept the Facebook website
[33]. Generally speaking, the advantage of Huang’s methodology is that they find proxies
specifically targeting Facebook, whereas the advantage of our methodology is that we can
target our measurements for selected countries and for selected websites that have permissive
Flash socket policy files. This enables us to actively collect a broader measurement of proxies.
In comparing our results to Huang, the prevalence of proxies in our study is roughly
twice what was measured by Huang (0.41% versus 0.20%). In addition, we find a wider array
of malware, deceptive practices, and suspicious circumstances. Both of these results are likely
due to the more comprehensive measurements we make, avoiding a site such as Facebook that
is likely on the whitelist for many proxies. Our measurements of WebMakerPlus, Objectify
Media, Superfish, WiredTools, Internet Widgits Pty, ImpressX, and kowsar all represent
malware found only in our study. Likewise, the presence of spam infections from Sweesh and
AtomPark are unique to our study, as is the evidence of botnets using TLS proxies. We are
the first to identify a parental filter replacing an untrusted certificate with a trusted one. Our
country-specific measurement campaigns add additional data to the field.
We note that there are also some differences between the characteristics of the
substitute certificates detected in our study and Huang. For instance, we find that chain
depths of two or more certificates are more common. Chains with a depth of two or more
certificates accounted for 20% of our substitute chains and 9% of Huang’s. Note that the
legitimate chains in both studies had a chain depth of two. In addition, 68 of our proxy
results contained a chain depth of 5, compared to only 2 reported by Huang. Due to these
depth differences, we also found more certificate chain sizes larger than 1000 bytes (20% vs
9%). We also see differences in the public key sizes of substitute certificates when comparing
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our results to those of Huang. In particular, we find less certificates using 512-bit key lengths
(us: 21, Huang: 119) and the presence of keys larger than 2048 (us: 7, Huang: 0).
The only other paper to find evidence of TLS proxies is the work from The Netalyzer
project, which analyzes the root store of Android devices [63]. Their primary findings include
the use of manufacturer and vendor-specific certificates, the presence of unusual root certs,
and third party apps that manipulate the root store. In addition, they find one case of a
TLS proxy, out of 15,000 assessed TLS sessions. The app whitelists several sites, including
Facebook, Twitter, and several Google sites, but intercepts mail from Yahoo, Google, and
traffic to several major banks. It is difficult to compare the prevalence (1 in 15K) to rates
found by Huang and this paper because the sample is from users choosing to download the
Netalyzer App.
Another closely related paper is the Crossbear system [31], which is designed for
volunteer hunters to work together to detect and localize real-world TLS MITM attacks.
After the client establishes a TLS connection to a website, the client sends the received
certificate chain to a central Crossbear server. The Crossbear server establishes its own
secure connection with the website and also queries Convergence for additional data about
the website’s certificate. This information is recorded in a database on the server and is also
sent to the client. If the cumulative data received by the client suggest a MITM is present,
the client performs a traceroute operation to the malicious server and sends that information
to the Crossbear server. The Crossbear server attempts to localize the origin of the MITM
attacker by using traceroute data from many Crossbear clients. Crossbear was deployed in
150 locations on the PlanetLab testbed and had not detected any attacks (or benevolent TLS
proxies) at the time of the report.
Finally, a number of surveys collect and analyze TLS certificates and certificate
authorities on the Internet [3, 7, 18, 20, 30]. These studies do not examine the use of
substitute certificates by TLS proxies, but focus on issues such as TLS errors, properties of
certificates and the PKI system, and poor security practices.
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11.3

Surveys

There have been prior studies that survey user’s attitudes about their online security and
privacy. Still, no prior study has looked specifically at user attitudes toward the inspection of
encrypted traffic.
McDonald and Cranor [49] used interviews and a survey to explore user’s knowledge
and perception of online behavioral advertising practices. They discuss the potential chilling
effect of these practices based on 40% of the users that self-reported they would change their
behavior if they learned advertisers were collecting data. Similarly, users reported in our
survey that they would change their behavior if they learned that their encrypted data was
being inspected.
Ur et al. [62] also studied user opinions about online behavioral advertising by conducting 48 semi-structured interviews with non-technical users. Similar to our work, they
found users had nuanced opinions about the trade-offs for a technology that was both useful
and privacy invasive. They determined that users were not receiving effective notice and
choice mechanisms. Our surveys reveal a strong desire for notification and choice regarding
the inspection of encrypted traffic.
Shay et al. [58] surveyed users via Amazon Mechanical Turk about their attitudes
and experiences with compromised email or social networking sites. They found that many
respondents gave high quality responses to open response questions and discussed implications
for security mechanism designers. Likewise, our work has significance for the designers of
mechanisms to inspect encrypted traffic.
Anton et al. [8] surveyed users in 2008 to see if their attitudes on privacy concerns
had changed from the same survey administered in 2002. They found that the top three
concerns of U.S. users were information transfer, notice/awareness, and information storage.
While the top three concerns had not changed, their level of concern had risen. The top
three concerns for European users were the same but in a different order; notice/awareness
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came in third place. Concerns for notice/awareness are important to both groups, and was a
prominent factor in our surveys.
Woodruff et al. [67] examined how well users’ classification by the Westin Privacy
Segmentation Index predicted their actual behavior. They found that although many
participants were classified as privacy fundamentalists, their actions in hypothetical situations
were not consistent with this classification. Similarly, while we group participants into
personas with names similar to the Westin categories, we do so by looking at how participants
indicate they would react to hypothetical situations and not using any of Westin’s several
privacy indexes.
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Chapter 12
Conclusion

Our work provides new perspectives on TLS proxies to the security community, both
from the quantitative technical viewpoint of our measurement tool as well as the qualitative
viewpoint of our survey participants. Our measurement studies, obtained from clients in
well over a hundred countries, exposed a variety of TLS proxies worldwide. Analysis of
substitute certificate fields shows that most TLS proxies claim to be acting on behalf of
users, behaving as firewalls for both personal and business use. However, since TLS proxies
violate the normal hierarchy of trust, it is impossible to verify the identities professed in
such fields. Despite this, we have found eight distinct, self-identifying malware which proxied
over 3,600 of our total connections. Even more TLS proxy instances chose to remain entirely
anonymous by providing indiscernible or no information in substitute certificate data. Our
additional findings of telecom-run TLS proxies, null issuer fields, and falsified certificate
authority signatures further highlight the need for transparency in this area. We find that
overall, 0.41% of all connections tested are behind a TLS proxy. Given that both benevolent
and malicious uses of TLS proxies use similar if not identical methodologies, distinguishing
between the two is a difficult task.
The prevalence of malware using TLS proxying techniques illustrates the need for
stronger controls over the root stores of browsers and operating systems. Modifying the
root store should require administrative privileges, and monitoring software should be used
to remove certificates from the store that are considered malicious or that are run by
untrustworthy organizations. We also stress the need for better systems in the browser
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and operating system to assist in both user awareness of proxy presence and distinguishing
between benevolent and malicious uses of TLS proxies.
In addition, better measurement tools are needed to understand the prevalence and
nature of TLS proxies. The method used by Huang is still viable, but only works to detect
proxies affecting a single server. Our measurements indicate that this may undercount proxies
when that server is well-known, and yet measuring at well-known servers is the only way to
get large amounts of data with this method. Using a Flash advertisement provides a more
scalable and robust method for detecting proxies, but this does not work if a user has an ad
blocker installed. Moreover, we have found that most advertising networks no longer allow
these types of advertisements. In the future, a community-driven, voluntary measurement
platform would significantly help to collect these types of measurements.
The diversity of TLS proxy behavior and prevalence found in our measurement study
prompted us to survey user attitudes toward TLS proxies. Our surveys, which constitute
the first surveys of general (i.e., non-expert) user attitudes toward TLS proxies, contain
responses from 1,976 people. Responses indicate that participants hold nuanced opinions on
security and privacy trade-offs, with most recognizing legitimate uses for the proxies, but
are concerned about threats from hackers or government surveillance. A significant concern
about malicious uses of TLS inspection is identity theft, and many would react negatively
and some would change their behavior if they discovered inspection occurring without their
knowledge. We also find that a small but significant number of participants are jaded by the
current state of affairs and have lost any expectation of privacy.
User attitudes toward TLS proxies provide an important data point along the spectrum
of discussion that is currently taking place regarding who should have access to encrypted
information. The results of our survey demonstrate that participants were generally aware
of the trade-offs between privacy and security, and that most participants were willing to
sacrifice some privacy for additional security. Nevertheless, participants strongly supported
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notification and consent for when encrypted traffic is being inspected. We stress the importance
of considering these views as the security community rises to the task of tackling TLS proxies.
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Appendix A
Surveys
A.1

First Survey

Page 1
We are conducting an academic research survey about public opinions on Internet security.
The survey will take approximately 5 minutes.
We will not collect any personally identifying information. If you do not complete the survey
we will not store any of your responses. If you have any questions or concerns about the
information collected, please contact us at [email redacted].
Page 2
What is your gender?
◦ Male
◦ Female
◦ I prefer not to answer
What is your age?
◦ 18 – 24 years old
◦ 25 – 34 years old
◦ 35 – 44 years old
◦ 45 – 54 years old
◦ 55 years or older
◦ I prefer not to answer
What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?
◦ Some school, no high school diploma
◦ High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED)
89

◦
◦
◦
◦

Some college or university credit, no degree
College or university degree
Post-secondary education
I prefer not to answer

What is your marital status?
◦ Married
◦ Single
◦ Other
◦ I prefer not to answer
Do you have children?
◦ Yes
◦ No
◦ I prefer not to answer
In which country do you reside?
Page 3
Where are taking this survey?
◦ Home
◦ Work
◦ School
◦ Library
◦ Retail (coffee shop, internet cafe, etc.)
◦ Other
◦ I prefer not to answer
What type of Internet connection are you using?
◦ Wired
◦ WiFi
◦ Cellular (3G, 4G, etc.)
◦ Other
◦ I don’t know
◦ I prefer not to answer
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How knowledgeable are you about Internet security?
◦ Expert
◦ Highly knowledgeable
◦ Mildly knowledgeable
◦ Somewhat knowledgeable
◦ No Knowledge
◦ I prefer not to answer
When connecting to a website securely, for example when doing online shopping
or banking, who should be able to see the contents of your Internet traffic?
(Choose all that apply)
◦ Me
◦ My Internet provider
◦ The website
◦ Malicious individuals
◦ Everyone
Page 4
When you connect to the Internet you do so through some organization’s network. For example, at home you connect to your Internet service provider’s (ISP) network, while at work you
connect to your employer’s network. To protect your information from others on the network
you can create secure connections to the websites you use (HTTPS). This is done automatically
for you when you log into a website. The secure connection encrypts your Internet traffic so that no one else can view or modify your communication with the website (see Figure A).

Figure A
The network you use to connect to the Internet can also be set up to use a system called a
TLS proxy. TLS proxies sit in the middle of your secure connection to the websites you view
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(see Figure B). At the TLS proxy your Internet traffic is decrypted and the web proxy can
view and modify it. Afterwards, the TLS proxy will then re-encrypt your traffic and forward
it along. This is done silently and without the knowledge of you or the website you connect to.

Figure B
TLS proxies can be set up by the organization that controls your Internet (for example, your
ISP, school, or employer) and also by malicious attackers. TLS proxies have many different
uses:

Protective
Malicious
Blocking malware and viruses Stealing passwords
Protecting company secrets
Identity theft
Blocking harmful websites
Tracking government dissidents
Catching malicious individuals Spying (for example the NSA)
Censorship
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree
◦ The above description of TLS proxies helped me to clearly understand what TLS proxies
are and how they are used.
Page 5
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree
◦ Prior to taking this survey, I was aware that organizations were using TLS proxies.
◦ TLS proxies are an invasion of privacy.
◦ There are acceptable uses for TLS proxies.
Only seen if selected "Agree" or "Strongly Agree" to acceptable uses for TLS proxies.
Please explain which organizations should be allowed to use TLS proxies and for
what purpose. (only shown on an Agree or Strongly Agree answer from above)
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Only seen if selected "Disagree" or "Strongly Disagree" to acceptable uses for
TLS proxies.
Please explain why TLS proxies should never be allowed.
Page 6
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree
◦ I am concerned that TLS proxies could be used by hackers to compromise my Internet
security.
◦ I am concerned that TLS proxies could be used by the government to collect my personal
information.
◦ Browsers should notify users if there is a TLS proxy intercepting and decrypting their
Internet traffic.
◦ There should be legislation that addresses TLS proxies.
Only seen if selected "Agree" or "Strongly Agree" to legislation that addresses
proxies.
What should legislation that addresses TLS proxies do? (Choose all that apply)
◦ Prevent their use
◦ Require organizations to obtain consent before using a TLS proxy
◦ Require organizations to inform users when a TLS proxy is being used
◦ I don’t believe that legislation is required
◦ Other
Page 7
The following statements and questions are about how you would personally react to having
a TLS proxy on a network you use to connect to the Internet.
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree
◦ I believe TLS proxies are in use on a network I use to connect to the Internet.
Please explain what concerns you have about a TLS proxy being used on a network you personally use to connect to the Internet.
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Please explain how it would change your opinion of an organization if you discovered that they were using a TLS proxy.
If you have any other thoughts, please share them with us below:

A.2

Second Survey

Page 1
What is your gender?
◦ Male
◦ Female
◦ I prefer not to answer
What is your age?
◦ 18 – 24 years old
◦ 25 – 34 years old
◦ 35 – 44 years old
◦ 45 – 54 years old
◦ 55 years or older
◦ I prefer not to answer
What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed?
◦ Some school, no high school diploma
◦ High school graduate, diploma or the equivalent (for example: GED)
◦ Some college or university credit, no degree
◦ College or university degree
◦ Post-secondary education
◦ I prefer not to answer
What is your marital status?
◦ Married
◦ Single
◦ Other
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◦ I prefer not to answer
Do you have children?
◦ Yes
◦ No
◦ I prefer not to answer
In which country do you reside?
◦ United States
◦ India
◦ Other
How knowledgeable are you about Internet security?
◦ Expert
◦ Highly knowledgeable
◦ Mildly knowledgeable
◦ Somewhat knowledgeable
◦ No Knowledge
◦ I prefer not to answer
Page 2
When you connect to the Internet you do so through some organization’s network. For example, at home you connect to your Internet service provider’s (ISP) network, while at work you
connect to your employer’s network. To protect your information from others on the network
you can create secure connections to the websites you use (HTTPS). This is done automatically
for you when you log into a website. The secure connection encrypts your Internet traffic so that no one else can view or modify your communication with the website (see Figure A).

Figure A
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The network you use to connect to the Internet can also be set up to use a system called a
TLS proxy. TLS proxies sit in the middle of your secure connection to the websites you view
(see Figure B). At the TLS proxy your Internet traffic is decrypted and the web proxy can
view and modify it. Afterwards, the TLS proxy will then re-encrypt your traffic and forward
it along. This is done silently and without the knowledge of you or the website you connect to.

Figure B
TLS proxies can be set up by the organization that controls your Internet (for example, your
ISP, school, or employer) and also by malicious attackers. TLS proxies have many different
uses:

Protective
Malicious
Blocking malware and viruses Stealing passwords
Protecting company secrets
Identity theft
Blocking harmful websites
Tracking government dissidents
Catching malicious individuals Spying (for example the NSA)
Censorship
Ordering of questions randomized.
Strongly Disagree, Disagree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Agree, Strongly Agree
◦ The above description of TLS proxies helped me to clearly understand what TLS proxies
are and how they are used.
◦ Stealing passwords and identity theft are in the list of malicious uses shown above.
◦ Blocking malware and viruses are in the list of malicious uses shown above.
◦ Prior to taking this survey, I was aware that organizations were using TLS proxies.
◦ TLS proxies are an invasion of privacy.
◦ There are acceptable uses for TLS proxies.
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Page 3
For each scenario listed below, provide your opinion on whether or not the organization
should be allowed to run a TLS proxy.
Ordering of questions randomized.
No, Only if I consent, Only if I am notified (consent not required), Yes (Neither
notification nor consent required), Unsure
◦ Your employer when you use a company computer
◦ Your employer when using your own device (cell phone, tablet, laptop)
◦ Elementary school
◦ Public Library
◦ University
◦ Paid WiFi – Airport, Hotel, Cafe, etc.
◦ Free WiFi – Airport, Hotel, Cafe, etc.
◦ The company that provides Internet access at your home
◦ Personal firewall – software that you have installed to protect your computer
◦ Your government monitoring your Internet traffic
Page 4
Please feel free to write any thoughts you have on the subject of TLS proxies.
We will use this information to help guide future research. (Optional)

97

